

**DEVELOPING A HOLISTIC RESOLUTION FRAMEWORK TO
ADDRESS THE CONFLICT IN SOUTH, CENTRAL SOMALIA**

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Master of Arts in Social Transformation with specialization in Governance**

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Declaration

I, George Owinow, do declare that this Thesis is my original work and has not been presented for any academic credit or degree in any other College or University. It is submitted in partial fulfillment for the requirements of degree of Masters of Arts in Social Transformation (Governance). All the information obtained from other sources has been duly acknowledged.

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
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Dedication

This work is dedicated to all those gallant soldiers of the Kenya Defence Forces who have paid the ultimate price while serving to bring peace to Somalia and to defend our motherland Kenya.

Table of Contents

Declaration	i
Dedication	ii
Table of Contents	iii
List of Figures	viii
List of Tables	ix
Abbreviations and Acronyms	x
Operational Definition of Key Terms	xii
Acknowledgement	xiii
Abstract	xiv
CHAPTER ONE	1
GENERAL INTRODUCTION	1
1.0 Introduction and Background to the Study	1
1.1 Historical background	1
1.2 International Community Efforts for Somalia Peace Process	5
1.3 Insertion (Personal Experience)	5
1.4 Statement of the problem	7
1.5 Objectives of the study	7
1.7 Justification of the study	8
1.8 Scope of the study	8
1.9 Limitation of the study	9
1.10 Organization of the study	9
1.11 Conclusion	10
CHAPTER TWO	11
LITERATURE REVIEW	11
2.0 Introduction	11
2.1 Underlying causes of the conflict	11
2.2 Conflicts: The Global Perspective	14
2.3 Conflicts in Africa	15
2.4 Conflict analysis	17
2.4.1 Analyzing the Somali conflict	18
2.4.3 Elements of analysis	20

2.4.4	Parties.....	20
2.4.5	Differences.....	21
2.4.6	Interests.....	21
2.4.7.	Value Differences.....	21
2.4.8	Human Needs.....	22
2.4.9	Goals/Issues.....	22
2.4.10	Strategies/Styles.....	22
2.4.11	Colonial Legacy.....	23
2.4.12	Governance and State Fragility.....	24
2.4.13	Competition for Power and Resources.....	24
2.4.14	Resource Scarcity.....	25
2.4.15	National Integration and Social Cohesion.....	25
2.4.16	Clan Politicization.....	25
2.4.17	Youth Vulnerability.....	26
2.4.18	War Economy.....	27
2.4.19	Religious Fundamentalism.....	27
2.4.20	Armed Groups Involvement.....	28
2.4.21	External Actors.....	29
2.5	Conflict Resolution Theory.....	30
2.6	Theoretical Framework.....	33
2.6.1	Conflict theory (Karl Marx).....	33
2.6.2	Conflict resolution theory (Morton Devesch).....	34
2.6.3	Theoretical Framework Design.....	34
2.7	Conceptual Framework.....	35
2.8.	Conflict resolution framework design.....	37
2.8.1	Intergrated Conflict Resolution Framework.....	37
CHAPTER THREE.....		39
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY.....		39
3.0	Introduction.....	39
3.1	Research Design.....	39
3.2	Target Population.....	39
3.3	Study Location.....	39
3.4	Sample Size.....	40
3.5	The Research Sampling Procedure.....	40

3.6	Data Collection Techniques and Instruments	40
3.7	Data Analysis	41
3.8	Ethical Considerations	41
CHAPTER FOUR.....		42
DATA COLLECTION, ANALYSIS AND PRESENTATION		42
4.0	Introduction.....	42
4.1	Data Presentation	42
4.1.1	The Political Causes of the Somali Conflict.....	42
4.1.2	The effects of Military on the Conflict	45
4.1.3	The Economic causes of the Somali Conflict.....	46
4.1.4.	The Social Causes of the Somali Conflict	48
4.1.4.1	Gender.....	48
4.1.4.2	Religion.....	50
4.1.4.3	The Clan factors.....	51
4.1.5	The Environmental causes of the Somali Conflict	51
4.2.	Summary findings.....	53
4.2.1	Political Sector	53
4.2.2	Economic Sector	54
4.2.3	Societal Sector	57
4.2.4	Security Sector	61
4.2.5	Environmental Sector.....	67
4.2.6	Somali conflict resolution plan	68
4.2.7	Conclusion	71
CHAPTER FIVE		72
FAITH AND CULTURAL REFLECTION IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION		72
5.0	Introduction.....	72
5.1.	Social transformation and the Pastoral Cycle in conflict resolution.....	72
5.1.1	Social transformation	73
5.1.2	The Pastoral Cycle	73
5.1.3	Contact	74
5.1.4	Analysis.....	75
5.1.5	Reflection.....	75
5.1.6	Response	75
5.2	Faith (Islam) in the Somali Conflict	76

5.2.1	Islamic Awakening in Somalia	77
5.2.2	Evolution of Islamic Awakening in Somalia	78
5.2.3	The Role of Religion in the Somali Conflict	78
5.2.4	Conclusion	79
CHAPTER SIX.....		81
GENERAL SUMMARY, RECOMMENDATIONS AND RESOLUTION IMPLEMETATION PLAN 81		
6.0	General Summary	81
6.1	Recommendations.....	82
6.1.1	Political Sector	82
6.1.2	Governance	83
6.1.3	Power Relations and Political Roadmap.....	83
6.1.4	External Actors	83
6.2	Security Sector	83
6.2.1	Security Governance.....	84
6.2.2	Local Security Strategies	84
6.3	Economic Sector	84
6.3.1	Resource mobilization and distribution	84
6.3.2	Economic Security and Power	85
6.3.3	Political Institutions	85
6.3.4	Somalia Business Community	85
6.3.5	New Generation Entrepreneurs.....	86
6.3.6	Peace Entrepreneurs.....	86
6.4	Societal Sector	87
6.4.1	Clan Elders.....	87
6.4.2	The Youth	87
6.4.3	Somali Women in Conflict Resolution.....	88
6.4.4	The Clan.....	89
6.4.5	The Islamic Factor and Social Order	89
6.5	The Environmental Sector	90
6.6	Conclusion	91
6.7	General Conclusion.....	95
6.8	Dissemination of the thesis	95
References.....		96
APPENDIX 1:RESEARCH QUESTIONNAIRE TO BE COMPLETED BY RESPONDENT..		104

SECTION A: SOCIAL FACTORS	105
SECTION B: GOVERNANCE	106
SECTION C: SECURITY	107
SECTION D: ECONOMICS	108
SECTION E: GENDER.....	109
SECTION F: RELIGION	110
SECTION G: ENVIRONMENT	111
APPENDIX 2: DISCUSSION GUIDE FOR FOCUS GROUP (ELDERS AND RELIGIOUS LEADERS).....	112
Appendix 3: Research Budget.....	113
Appendix 4: Map of Somalia.....	114
Appendix 5: Field trip to Doble-Somalia.....	115
Appendix 6: Meeting with focus group – Kismayo.....	116
Appendix 7: Research Assistant at village – Doble.....	117

List of Figures

Figure 1:	Conflict Analysis Framework	21
Figure 2:	Framework design for resolution of Conflict	36
Figure 3:	Sectoral approach to conflict resolution	39
Figure 4:	Integrated conflict resolution framework	40
Figure 5:	Response on effects of governance on the conflict	47
Figure 6:	Conflict resolution matrix	73

List of Tables

Table 1.0:	Major Peace Conference for Somalia	5
Table 2.0:	Burtons Conflict resolution framework	34
Table 4.1:	Response on effect of governance	46
Table 4.2:	The effect of security on the Somali conflict	48
Table 4.3:	The effect of the economy on the Somali conflict	49
Table 4.4:	Gender and the Somali conflict	52
Table 4.5:	Effect of religion on the Somali conflict	53
Table 4.6:	The clan factor on the Somali conflict	54
Table 4.7:	Effect of environmental factors on the Somali conflict	55

Abbreviations and Acronyms

AU	African Union
AEPI	American Environmental Peace Institute
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
CSO	Civil Society Organizations'
DSC	District Safety Committees
FGS	Federal Government of Somalia
ICU	Islamic Courts Union
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
ICG	International Crisis Group
ISIS	Islamic States of Iraq and Syria
KDF	Kenya Defence Forces
NESAP	National Environmental Strategy Action Plan
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NSP	National Security Policy
NSSP	National Security Stabilization Plan
OAG	Organized Armed Groups
ONLF	Ogaden National Liberation Front
PCM	Pastoral Cycle Methodology

PSC	Protracted Social Conflict
PSO	Peace Support Operations
SNA	Somalia National Army
SNP	Somalia National Policy
TFG	Transitional Federal Government
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSOM	United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia
USA	United States of America
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WB	World Bank

Operational Definition of Key Terms

Clan	A group of people united by actual or perceived kinship and decent. Even if lineage details are unknown clan members may be organized around a founding member of apical ancestor.
Ethnic group	Pertaining to a characteristic of a people, especially a group sharing a common and distinctive culture, religion, language or linguistic tradition.
Conflict	To come into disagreement or collision with opposing opinions which if not resolved may result into violence and disruptions of normalcy.
Multi-dimensional	Concerning anything with many different aspects in the relationship or variances in definition.
Holistic	Concerned with complete systems rather than individual parts of a figure concept or situation.
Extremism	Beliefs that are contrary to common norms that leads to extra-ordinary and more often unreasonable action.
Conflict resolution	An umbrella term which means the study and practice of theories and actions that brings peace between disputants.
Conflict Management	The process of limiting the negative aspects of conflict while increasing the positive aspects of conflict.

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Abstract

Since 1991, Somalia has been in a state of conflict, particularly in the South and Central regions. Several attempts to reconstruct the state have failed and the current African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) peace process is not guaranteed to succeed either. The multi-dimensional nature of intractable conflicts requires that interveners understand the system of conflicts from various perspectives and approach it comprehensively. This study was guided by three objectives: First, to establish the underlying causes of the conflict particularly in South and Central Somali through an analysis. Second, through study and review of literature to explore and determine appropriate measures to address the issues underlying and driving the conflict, and lastly, to develop a suitable conflict resolution framework that will address the conflict in a holistic manner. The research was conducted in parts of South, and Central Somalia experiencing the conflict. The research has adopted two theories related to conflict. These are Karl Marx's theory of conflict and Morton Devesch theory of conflict resolution which recognizes the existence of opposing forces in society due to competing interests. The guiding theory of Devesch adapted by this research contends that conflict resolution factors such as goals, aims and issues are pivotal in determining the success of the resolution mechanisms adopted by negotiators. A descriptive research design with a qualitative approach was used in the study. The target group for this study included elected persons from groups deemed to be directly involved and affected by the conflict such as leaders at all levels, Somali elders, religious leaders, women, the youth and the security agencies involved in the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). The research used a non-probability sampling technique which sought to involve a number of respondents that form a fair representation of the people affected by the conflict and those involved in its resolutions. Data collected was analysed qualitatively to generate information on the respondents view on key issues addressed. The study found that the conventional method of resolving conflict in a Politico-Security fashion was inadequate in addressing some fundamental issues. It was therefore necessary to adopt a more holistic approach to address most of the issues. The framework designed to address the issues combined peace research theory and peace practice by practitioners who must work together in the resolution process. The research further emphasizes the need for close coordination and synchronization of activities in time and space to ensure success. More research is therefore recommended in the area of coordination of the resolution process.

CHAPTER ONE

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

1.0 Introduction and Background to the Study

This chapter presents in brief a historical background of the Country Somalia. The essence of this is to provide an introductory context that situates Somalia in a global perspective and traces the origins of the conflict that has lasted since 1991. Understanding the history of Somalia is critical in its conflict resolution. The study will however mainly focus on the South and Central regions of Somalia where the fighting has largely been centered. The chapter further presents, insertion, background of the study, statement of the problem, objectives of the study, research questions, justification, scope and limitation of the study.

1.1 Historical background

Conflict in society is a phenomenon that is inevitable. In Africa in particular the roots of many post-colonial conflicts, such as the recent case of South Sudan, remain buried in Africa's past and specifically in the colonization and decolonization process. In resolving these conflicts, the imposing of peace-keeping forces or merely imposing new political and economic institutions may not provide the desired durable outcome.

Somalia is one of the longest cases of complete state collapse in Africa's post - colonial era. It has also seen some of the world's most intensive interventions and mediation efforts to try to bring the crisis to an end. The conflict resolution initiatives have varied in approach with most ending in failure, or limited success. The Somalia crisis has been especially challenging for external mediators. The protracted nature of the conflict has not created a hurting stalemate to the protagonists, but has instead deepened divisions and added new layers of complications into the search for peace.

Over the past two decades the nature of the Somali crisis and the international context within which it is occurring has been constantly changing. The conflict has mutated from a power struggle to a civil war in the early 1990's. The international environment in the same breadth also changed from the end of the cold war to the global war on terror, which impacts directly on the Somali crisis and international responses to it.

The history of Somalia studied by the socio-anthropologist, Michael Lewis, traces the Somali history up to the period of the conflict, (Lewis, 1965). His other research *Understanding*

Somalia gives insights into the history and culture of the Somali society (Lewis, 2008). These studies however, fail to clearly project a continuum into the Somalia conflict. It is therefore the intention of this research to explore the Somalia conflict in a wider context beyond the traditional conflict analysis theories. The Somalis, previously, were non-Muslims and were trading with the Pharaohs of Egypt and with India (Farah, 2007, p.7). The question of land ownership then was different before Islam arrived in the region. Formerly, the land belonged to the clan families dwelling on it. The new religion however advocated that land belonged to Allah (God). Any Muslim was therefore entitled to land and any of its uses thereof. This opened the entire territory to every Muslim regardless of their origin. This concept of freehold on land may well be traced to the Middle East, where Islam originated. Due to the desert nature and the bedouins nomadic communities, land was not given value, more so to ownership. However, this concept would later on cause conflict in Somalia since land was used for grazing or agriculture hence ownership was crucial for survival. The question of land and clan demography continues to be a source of conflict in present day Somalia.

The Somali people ethnically and culturally belong to the Hermitic ethnic group (Lewis, 2002, p.4). Some studies earlier referred to Somalis as ‘a mixed race of Arabs’ and some as ‘people of African origin’ (Elmi, 2010, p.10). Due to the social connections with the Arabian peninsula, they have a perceived dual identity. Islam, as a religion, has continued to play a central role in the Somali culture, politics and conflict. Somalis are a culturally homogenous people. Within the Somali ethnic groups, there are many clans and sub-clans that are based on patrilineal kinship (Lewis, 2002). Prior to European colonialist arrival, Somalis did not have a central state in the context of a bureaucratic state, composed of numerous agencies led and coordinated by a central executive authority. The state has the ability or authority to make and implement binding rules for all the people, as well as, the parameters of rule-making for other social organizations in a given territory. The state may use force if necessary to have its way (Migdal, 1988, p.19). Emphasis here for the State is on the rule of legitimate authority, rational bureaucracy, control over territory and instruments of violence. The pre-colonial Somalia, lacked this bureaucracy, so that at its introduction, by the colonialist, a conflict was inevitable, between the new system and the people.

The colonial powers divided Somalia into British, French and Italian Somaliland. Ethiopia, Somalia’s neighbour was not colonized. It was later on given a portion of the British Somaliland, the Ogaden region mainly inhabited by Somalis to administer. This region was later to play a significant role in the Somali conflict. The colonial powers dismissed the idea of the land belonging to Allah and negotiated access to the territories with friendly elders of clan

families. The land that had belonged to the clan, then to Allah was now given away to colonialists. From then on, the colonialists had the authority to claim ownership of the land and required all Somalis to carry identification cards. This phenomenon tended to limit the freedom of the people, causing discontent, and tensions between the people and the rulers.

The colonial occupation overly challenged the rules of Islam and this created an anti-colonial resistance with a clear religious impetus. The strongest resistance to the colonial presence was led by the Somali warrior, Sayyid Mohammed Hassan in 1903, whom the British named the 'Mad Mullah' (Lewis, 2002, p.70). The resistance was to be the genesis of the independence struggle.

Somalia became independent in 1960, amalgamating the then British colony of British Somaliland to the North, with the Italian Somaliland to the South. This left out the three Somali inhabited regions of, French Somaliland (Djibouti), Ogaden province in Ethiopia, and the North Eastern Province of Kenya. The Somali state was however inherently incomplete, since leaving out the three regions, meant more than half of the country was still not included within the Somali common interest. The goal of Somali nationalist of uniting the entire Somali could not be achieved, and further action had to result. Since 1977, Somalia has gone through an unprecedented protracted conflict. The leadership of the first president, Abdilrashid Ali, was fairly peaceful until the military takeover by General Mohamed Said Barre in 1969 and subsequent war with Ethiopia in 1977, (Elmi, 2006, p.6).

Between 1977 and 1991, the country endured three major armed conflicts. The first was the Ogaden war with Ethiopia between 1977 - 1979, in which Somali forces intervened in support of Somali separatist fighters in a bid to liberate the Somali inhabited region of the Ogaden. Somalia lost the Ogaden war and suffered about 25,000 casualties. The defeat informed the future internal conflict, fueled by power struggles, thus prompting the rise of several Somali liberation movements, based on clans intending to overthrow the Barre regime.

In 1991, Siad Barre was ousted by various armed clan factions originating from the Ogaden war creating a political power vacuum resulting in anarchy. However, none of the armed groups was dominant enough to exert authority over the whole of Somalia. Subsequently, Somalia was engulfed by chaos without a viable central authority. Most of the fighting was across clan lines or clan alliances. The Northern and North Eastern part of Somalia with homogeneous clans respectively have endured relative calm. The two areas sought cessation to form Somaliland and Puntland respectively, though not recognized by the international community. The lower, central and southern Somalia with multiple clans have continued in

conflict and fighting by different clan based armed groups. The conflict in Somalia has prompted the intervention of regional and international actors seeking to restore peace and order in the country. So far, there has been numerous political, diplomatic or military interventions but without much success (Elmi, 2010, p.21).

The fragility of Somalia is therefore a security threat to its immediate neighbours and beyond. A state's main goal is to provide its citizens with security. A strong state must ensure that its borders are secure and that its citizens are not engaged in internal conflict. The state can deliver a host of other public goods only when it sustains a reasonable measure of security within its borders and when neighbouring states do so as well. It is in Kenya's security interest therefore that Somali should be a strong and stable state.

The International Community has made several attempts to secure peace in Somalia. There were five major conferences that the International community supported. In addition, at least twelve more conferences were held, all outside of Somalia and all of which failed. The first conference was organized by Djibouti in August 1991. It also hosted two rounds of conferences in May and June 2008 for the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the Alliance for the Liberation of Somalia. Kenya hosted a conference for the Somalia groups in April 1994 and October 1996. Thereafter, in 2001, Kenya hosted two more conferences in Nairobi and Nakuru. Elsewhere, Yemen held talks for the Somali groups in April 1997. This conference was useful as it eliminated the 'green line' in Mogadishu that separated two factions of the United Somali Congress (USC) that had adopted hard-line positions in negotiations.

The other countries hosting conferences were Ethiopia: Sodare in 1996 and Awase in 2001. Sudan hosted three rounds of conferences between the TFG and the Union of Islamic Courts. Several factors contributed to the failure of these peace conferences, the major ones being mistrust among the protagonists, and the fact that some warlords came to the talks with the hindsight that they could win the war through military victory and therefore not interested in a negotiated settlement. Kenya has a large population of Somali speaking people, whose kin traverse the Kenya-Somalia border. The nature of the Somali conflict coupled with the geographical and historical relationships between the two countries, means that Kenya cannot completely be insulated from the Somalia conflict.

1.2 International Community Efforts for Somalia Peace Process

The International community made several political and diplomatic efforts to address the Somali conflict as tabulated below

Table 1.0 Major Peace conferences for Somalia

LOCATION	DATE	SPONSORED	PARTICIPANTS	OUTCOME	STATUS
Djibouti Conference (Djibouti)	08/1991	Djibouti	Six Factions	Accord	Failed
Addis Ababa Conference, (Ethiopia)	03/1993	UN	15 Factions	Peace Accord	Failed
Cairo Conference, (Egypt)	12/1997	Egypt	28 Factions	Peace Accord	Failed
Arta Conference, (Djibouti)	05-08,2000	Djibouti	More than 3,000 civil society members	Charter	Failed
Mbagathi Conference, (Kenya)	2000-2002	IGAD	Three main factions, Group 8 and many individuals	Charter	Failed

Source: Understanding the Somali conflagration (Elmi, 2010)

1.3 Insertion (Personal Experience)

The researcher was a member of the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) that on 14th October 2011, crossed into Somalia. This was necessitated by a series of cross-border attacks targeting tourists on the Kenyan coast and workers from the refugee camps in Dadaab in Northern Kenya. As a result of these attacks, travel advisories were issued to citizens from mainly western countries affecting the Kenyan economy. These events underscored the need for the Kenyan Government to take action so as to deter the terror groups operating from Somalia. Kenya's National interests were under threat and the demand for a firm response was necessary. Kenya sent its military forces into Somalia under Article 51 of the UN Charter which recognises self-defence. The Kenya Defence Forces later joined the African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in line with Kenya's International obligations and responsibility.

Kenya's involvement in the Somalia conflict is within the confines of the Just War Theory.

This theory adopts the Christian, political and philosophical morals contexts. As a rational theory, it sets forth moral conditions for waging and fighting wars and these conditions are intended to apply to all individuals and nations. Underlying this theory is the belief that nations have a right to self-defence. This means that, as long as the survival of a state is threatened, governments have the duty to protect themselves once peaceful efforts have failed. The theory, however, does not encourage waging of war but rather it is meant to prevent war. If war is inevitable then it has to be conducted morally. The founder of the Just war theory St Augustine, was mainly concerned whether it was really sinful for a Christian to wage war or not. He contends that God has given government the sword to protect peace, (Romans 13.4).

Additionally, while seconded to the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (2003-2006) the researcher observed that the role of third party intervention in African conflicts had been distorted by the traumatic experiences from the humanitarian interventions in Somalia. Further noted were the declining resources for engagement, coupled with a fatigue borne of the apparent intractability of conflicts in Africa. This led to a situation whereby it was becoming difficult for international policy makers to engage meaningfully in preventing or ending conflict. This had largely left Africa to review its own security architecture with mixed results.

Kenya has been involved directly and through regional and international organizations in the quest to find a lasting solution to the Somalia conflict. The Kenya Defence Forces are currently operating in Somalia under the umbrella of the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). The framework for resolving the conflict was drawn by the AU Peace and Security Council that borrowed heavily from traditional United Nations conflict resolution mechanisms. The UN's standard peace process is always to find a state actor who is then supported to take control, in this case, the Transition Federal Government (TFG) in Somalia. Although some progress has been realized in resolving the conflict, it is apparent that the resolution mechanisms in use are ineffectual.

Kenya's role on entry into Southern and parts of Central Somalia was to degrade the Al Shabaab's fighting capability and liberate the local population from its dominance. This, it was hoped would then allow local governance structures at the grass root level to be established, with the help of clan and religious leaders who hold opinion in the Somali society. This

military action alone did to achieve much success in the overall stabilization and reconstruction of these parts of Somalia and that a more holistic approach was necessary.

1.4 Statement of the problem

Despite numerous political, diplomatic, and military efforts to resolve the conflict in the South and Central regions of Somalia, there seems to be no proper solution attained yet. The same old problems of clan wars, insurgency, political instability, economic collapse, and environmental degradation, are still persistent. The numerous peace interventions have not yielded any tangible results that can ensure peace in Somalia. It is evident that the political security model employed by AMISOM has not succeeded in the last ten years of its existence.

Coleman (2006) argues that because of the multi-dimensionality of intractable conflicts, it is imperative that interveners understand the system of conflicts from various perspectives and approach it comprehensively. The attempts to resolve the Somalia conflict seem to fall short of what Coleman advises. The Somalia conflict however cannot just be left to the forces of chance, if the country and the region is to know peace. It is imperative, therefore, that a new approach to the resolution of the conflict be devised, failure to which Somalia will continue in conflict with serious consequences to its immediate neighbors, the region and internationally.

The conventional conflict resolution model employed by AMISOM mainly focuses on politics and security led by diplomats and the military forces as practitioners. This method has failed to achieve a solution to the Somali conflict and makes it necessary for a search for a new model to be conducted, in order that the conflict in Somalia be resolved. This thesis, therefore, seeks to investigate into the best comprehensive model of conflict resolution, applicable to the Somali situation.

1.5 Objectives of the study

Overall Objective

The overall objective of this study is to develop a conflict resolution mechanism that will address the conflict in South, Central Somalia in a holistic manner.

Specific Objectives:

1. To analyze the causes of the Somali conflict.
2. To develop strategies for a holistic solution to the Somali conflict.

3. To suggest the implementation plan for the solution of the Somali conflict.

1.6 Research Questions

- a. Why has the Somali conflict persisted for years, despite many attempts at solving it?
- b. What Strategies can peace –makers develop to help solve the Somali conflict?
- c. How can the conflict resolution strategies be implemented?

1.7 Justification of the study

Somalis, as well as the International Community, have tried many times to resolve the conflict that persists in Somalia. None of the many attempts has produced the intended results to reconcile the Somali groups, stop the civil war and establish a functioning state. Despite the conflict persisting for so long, studies that relate to Somali reconciliation and peace process are sparse (Elmi, 2010) and have rarely offered comprehensive solutions.

In the case of Somalia, the political power vacuum as a result of the fall of Siad Barre regime resulted into anarchy. This led to a state of civil war between clans, warlords, Islamists, nomads and agriculturalists. The conflict developed into what some scholars refer to as “intractable conflict” also known as “Protracted Social conflicts” (PSC).

This research is intended to contribute to the academic debate on the resolution of intractable conflicts, but also to provide ideas on handling the Somalia conflict, in particular, to provide a lasting solution to the problem, which has persisted for several decades, now. Policy makers might find this work useful in formulating policies for future conflict resolution. The findings of this research are likely to help in formulating policies and strategies for maintaining peace within the horn of Africa, which has been prone to conflicts for several years, and in that way, help in stemming the proliferation of arms to Kenya, Uganda and the region, increased disruption of the sea routes through piracy and armed militants spreading in the region.

1.8 Scope of the study

The study was carried out both in parts of South and Central Somalia. Due to the ongoing war with Al-Shabaab armed group, it was only possible to operate in areas where AMISOM personnel are deployed with the key major towns of Kismayo and Mogadishu where the federal government of Somalia is located. The study covers in brief Somalia’s history before and after independence in 1960 but lays greater emphasis on the period from 1991 when Siad Barre was

ousted up to 2014, approximately four years since AMISOM went to Somalia. The study reviewed AMISOM's conflict resolution framework which mainly focuses on state reconstruction and security leaving out other factors that drive the conflict. The study therefore proposes a more holistic approach.

1.9 Limitation of the study

The volatile security situation in Somalia limits free movement and interaction with the Somali people. During interaction, the local populations are either suspicious of any outsiders or afraid that interacting with them could endanger their lives from the armed groups who detest outsiders. This greatly limits the research in scope. The research was also challenged in content because not very much scholarly work has been written on the Somali conflict resolution, however some work has been done mainly on conflict mediation and management which this research acknowledges.

The researcher took time to examine literature related to the topic. Research assistants embedded with AMISOM forces were able to interact with the local population and other respondents through community service projects in villages and were able to collect data confidentially. AMISOM personnel had been in Somalia for a considerable time and were able to provide valuable data for this study. The researcher does not speak Somali language neither did most of the research assistants. It was therefore important to seek assistance from translators, although this may at times erode accuracy of information given by respondents. It is worth noting that the data collection was done within the context of AMISOM operations hence respondents were carefully selected from those whom mutual trust has been established, hence could give information willingly once convinced of their good intentions for Somalia.

1.10 Organization of the study

The study is organized into six chapters. The first chapter presents, historical background information, insertion and the study problem. It also gives the objectives of the study, research questions, justification of the study, scope and limitations of the study. Chapter two reviews related literature and theories informing the study culminating in the theoretical and conceptual framework. The third chapter is the research methodology including the research design, target population, sample size and data collection techniques. It involves data analysis methods and ethical considerations. Chapter four is data presentation and analysis giving a summary of findings and recommendations. The fifth chapter is a theological analysis and reflection. Chapter six concludes with an action plan for implementation.

1.11 Conclusion

The conflict in Somalia as this chapter has illustrated lies in its background history and other external factors that have influenced Somalia's politics. The problem identified lies with ineffective conflict resolution methods the interveners are applying. The objective of this study therefore is to analyze the courses underlying the conflict with a view to crafting a suitable resolution mechanism. The subsequent chapter will review literature related to conflict and conflict resolution.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.0 Introduction

This chapter explores literature on conflict in general but is concerned with the three critical areas that are the objectives of the study. The study was concerned with the literature on the underlying causes of conflict in general. This can be found within the domain of conflict analysis which was the next focus of literature reviewed. Literature on conflict resolution was further found useful, and enabled a development of resolution framework combining theory and concepts. As indicated earlier, contemporary literature on the conflict from the viewpoint of the Somalis themselves is scarce. Those available are from the diaspora or by outsider scholars mainly from countries in the north such as Menkhaus (2003 & 2004), Lewis (1994, 1999, 2002 & 2008), Rutherford (2008) and Moller (2009). African scholars such as Elmi and Barisse (2006), Osman (2007), and Othieno (2007a & 2007b). The chapter also describes the theoretical and conceptual frameworks the study is anchored on.

2.1 Underlying causes of the conflict

Managing and preventing conflict begins with the understanding of the sources of social struggles. The basis of conflict and related behavior can be explained in terms of human motivation, patterns of social interaction and institutions. The pursuit of specific goals by individuals or groups is based on the consideration of costs and benefits, as well as, beliefs about the likelihood of obtaining them. Incompatibility may exist due to misunderstandings derived from miscommunication of intentions. Intense struggle over differences in political, social or economic interests are perpetuated by actor's predispositions to violence (Wright, and Taylor, 2003) Actors pursuing interests however can still do so in a less violent and disruptive manner. There are many examples of peaceful co-existences of groups despite their different ambitions and struggles. The correct balance of power relations, good governance, tolerance and equitable resource distribution can ensure peaceful coexistence in Somalia

Aggression according to (Berkowitz, 1990) is a deliberate attempt at psychological and physical destruction. It is instrumental if motivated by external rewards or specific gains as opposed to a strong emotional arousal to injure others.

Aggression, instigated by political or economic benefits, may be learned independently of

frustration. This negative interplay of instinct in man needs to be constantly contained. The intervention of social institutions such as family and religion is necessary to reduce this instinct.

The level of aggression and violence witnessed in Somalia has progressively moved beyond political and economic benefits. Groups such as Al-Shabaab have created a narrative of Islamic jihad and an Islamic caliphate expansion ideology. According to the Dalai, Lama,(1997) human sentiment translates into a range of positive emotions such as compassion, beyond the negative emotions associated with destructive impulses. Requirements for love and social support can channel destructive energy flows into positive ones. In Somalia the clan structure is very important and highly respected. Clan ties serve as a pivot in social support and interactions. Interestingly, however, when clan rivalry occurs the level of negative emotions resulting into extreme violence cannot be understood easily.

Aggression can be traced to frustrations according to psychiatrist (Dollard, 1939). This frustration is not necessarily related to human instinct or nature. Frustration, as a psychological state, results from interference with an individual's pursuit of a desired object. Hindering goal seeking behavior, for example, related to reducing hunger and thirst, elicits an attack on the blocking source or its surrogate. (Conte, 2003). Thus the failure to obtain food, territory or even economic recession, exposes the predisposition to and readiness for violent behavior. Somalia is a mono-ethnic and mono-religious society. The struggles by a lower tier in society such as clans to the level that the collapse is unable to be reversed is intriguing. The aggression and levels of violence exhibited by groups can therefore not be attributed to frustrations and resources alone. This fact exposes the complexity of the Somalia conflict that requires a more in-depth analysis to resolve

Theories of aggression, whether being stimulated by the internal human psyche or externally, propose that, in order to control the conversion of frustration into aggression, destructive impulses need to be channeled into non-lethal forms of engagement. At the same time, there is a growing understanding that frustration does not automatically translate into violence. In fact, people respond differently to discontent in diverse emotional states of anger arousal and do not select the same methods for discharging frustration. Experiences, rather than genetic constitution, hold sway over the amount and direction of aggression (Brown, 1988).

The destruction of the Somalia society started with the poor governance of the Barre Regime. This culminated in his overthrow and subsequent collapse of the state. Such occurrences were common in many African countries during the cold war. The experiences with many countries

such as Uganda, Ghana, and Nigeria which also had spates of civil strife, despite their heterogeneous social structures is that they regained their foothold and restored some sense of stability. On the contrary Somalia whose social structure constitution is homogeneous has failed to redeem itself, hence the need for external intervention.

Human sufferings, sorrow and pain are largely characteristic of struggle. A boiling emotional love, replete with humiliation and rage, is involved in malignant social processes. Deep feelings of pride and a quest for dignity provide solidarity with a group (Schff, & Retringer, 1991). Extreme reactions are, in part, related to such emotional states as despair, disempowerment, helplessness, and a desire for revenge.

According to Algerian psychiatrist Fanon, (2004) brutal suppression is not capable of breaking the will of the oppressed. Moreover, the use of violence by the colonized frees them from their inferiority complex and despair. By using violence, the oppressed feel fearless restoring their self-respect. It is also important to note that emotional experiences are permeated with meanings. Our feelings of hate and rage are socially formulated in shaping relationships. In considering their different roles under diverse circumstances, raw emotions are tamed and acted upon in a dissimilar fashion.

Human needs as earlier indicated are a source of intractable social conflict. It emanates from a set of unsatisfied existential and other deep-seated needs. Human needs are ontological and essential elements for our subsistence, even though differences in culture and education might lead to diverse interpretations and salience. The theories of inter-group conflict situations driven by unmet needs have been applied to the analysis of many protracted struggles around the world, where the demand for autonomy or independence is prevalent (Mitchel, 2001). In addition, the denial of basic needs, not only physical but also psychological (self-esteem, recognition, and respect) has fuelled ethnic and other identity based conflict. The motivational aspect of social actions is thus relegated to the relentless pursuit of non-negotiable conditions of human existence.

Identity formation is a critical element in conflict. Identity plays an important role by maintaining boundary functions. Identity is related to the norms, beliefs, practices and traditions that influence one group's interaction with the surrounding environment. Identity formation relies on categorization that perceptually homogenizes In-groups visa –a-vis Out-groups “Them vs. ‘Us’” (Hogg, 2001). Threats to identity augment the potential for destructive conflict in conjunction with the fortification of rigid group boundaries.

Identity can further be politicized by groups to their advantage. An identity base has socio-political ramifications when positive and negative value systems are placed on skin colour, religion, gender, language, culture or occupation in justifying group relations. The illegitimate superiority of one group over another with the attendant disproportionate distribution of wealth and power sow the seeds of potential conflicts. The dominant groups endeavour to preserve their social and communicative distinctiveness by underrating the subordinate group's status (Bourdieu, 1991).

When one group is dominant and sets the political agenda, its claims are made at the expense of other groups' rights. Political or economic discrimination against constituent ethnic groups by state elite lies at the heart of most ethnic conflict. A wide variation in the number and sizes of minorities oppressed by state entities characterize conflict dynamics in such multi-ethnic or multicultural societies (Hechter, and Borland, 2001).

The uniqueness of the Somalia conflict case is that the society is monoethnic and monocultural. Clan divisions however are strong but have not at times depicted any desire to resolve their issues amicably. After the state collapse, there has not been any overarching entity that the clans have been revolting against, to the contrary the courts of Islamic union was able to bring the clans together under a religious umbrella. This is a model that is useful to this study.

2.2 Conflicts: The Global Perspective

In conflict studies, we find that individuals may be predisposed to the incitement to violence through an instinctive impulse associated with unfulfilled psychological needs. Intrapersonal tensions and other group variables may result in violence at many levels, such as interpersonal, inter-group, inter-societal and international. In this tradition, an inner stimulation explains the desire of one group to control other groups (Scharff, et al 2007). On the contrary, the Somali are overly suspicious of a central authority in form of government.

This probably comes after the Siad Barre regime experience. It is apparent that they prefer an arrangement where one group does not control other groups. This calls for a model of governance that is unique to the Somalis themselves.

Despite the evolution of human society, all cultures and civilizations have been full of experiences of uprisings, riots, coups, terrorism and revolution. These aggressive behavioural characteristics of the human species are explained by the primitive urge to fight and dominate even when not necessarily in reaction to some external event (Freud, 1993). This organic

mechanism of survival and adaptation is extrapolated from evolution history by the analogy to animal behavior (Corenz, 1966). The characteristic roots of violence can be traced to the instincts for destruction according to (Freud, 1993a). The drive for self-annihilation is deflected outward, for self-preservation purpose, to impel the destruction of external targets. The Somalia scenario exemplifies this phenomenon very clearly; however, it is also intriguing that when there is no external threat the clans lose cohesion and engage in fighting among themselves.

Competition for scarce resources is attributed to conflict. Most countries that have internal conflicts were also economically poorly performing before the onset of the conflict. Inversely those countries that have good economic growth records and where there is fair distribution of resources have less internal conflicts. The extent to which scarcity will cause conflict is dependent on the coping capabilities such as State or institutional capacity. Resource scarcity theory is closely related to relative deprivation theory advanced by Gurr, (1970). The Somalis from time immemorial have had successful resolution of conflicts particularly resource based conflicts using traditional mechanisms. It is therefore surprising that in the absence of a functioning central authority, these traditional mechanisms have not succeeded in resolving the conflict

2.3 Conflicts in Africa

Most conflicts in Africa can be traced to a number of common factors. In 1997, Kofi Annan the then Secretary General of the United Nations in his report to the UN Security Council observed, (Annan, 1997, p.2) that conflicts in Africa have stunted development and prosperity. The causes of conflicts he argued included colonial legacy, bad governance, bad policies and bad politics. It is worth noting however, that in Somalia an organization formed by clerics the Courts of Islamic Union (ICU) emerged as a central authority and managed to restore some sense of normalcy before they were defeated by Ethiopia. This group cut across clans which goes to prove that the clans indeed can co-exist peacefully and is a model that this study will pursue

A number of international and Somali scholars have examined the conflict and a possible road to peace, (Menkaus, 2003; Lewis 2008; Lederach 2011; Elmi 2010; Mwangi 2006). The dominant position among these scholars associates the origin of the conflict in Somalia to oppression under the dictatorship of Siad Barre, clan discrimination and corruption. As the state infrastructure collapsed in 1991 after the fall of Barre, the society entered into a security dilemma where groups organized their security. Every group then viewed each other as a

threat to their own security hence also arming themselves. The body of knowledge cumulatively presented by these Scholars, and recommendations, prescribe a conventional conflict resolution mechanism for Somalia. Unfortunately, most of these have been tried with no success. This study intends to suggest a different model of conflict resolution that should be attempted in the Somali conflict.

The “Greed Versus Grievance” theory of conflict advanced by Johan Galtung explores the existence of legitimate concerns among parties in conflict and also selfish control of resources. This was evident during the Siad Barre regime where only members of his clan and close relatives benefited from resources meant for the public good.

Greed refers to opportunistic and selfish appropriation of resources. Most conflicts particularly in Africa are associated with expression of dissatisfaction with governance, corruption, nepotism and discrimination (Mazrui, 2008). Groups express political and economic grievances against the state or other parties. Some scholars have also associated conflict with the insatiable need by some people to control or own resources. Land resources were made available only to the politically connected clan members of Barre, who were then able to utilize landlord status, to enrich themselves on rent payments at the expense of the rest (Besteman, 1996). This case reinforces the Greed theory of conflict.

In any State, the government as the overall holder of public good is responsible for the distribution of national resources. It must therefore be accountable and transparent in utilization of resources. The government of Siad Barre (1969 – 1991) was perceived as corrupt and discriminatory, favouring clans which the president belonged to at the expense of others (Elmi, 2007). This holds true for the Somali conflict and more so how State resources are distributed. Such conflicts are usually precipitated by the scarcity of resources.

Elbadawi and Sambaris (2002) observe that conflicts in Africa are caused by high levels of poverty, failed political institutions and dependence on natural resources. Armed groups emerge because of the government’s inability to address concerns of the people through democratic processes. In Somalia, armed groups emerged to remove Siad Barre from power, in the hope of changing power relations and taking control of the resources themselves. The groups, however, turned against each other as the struggle for power and control continued. Since there was no dominant group strong enough to defeat the rest, they fought to a stalemate. This has been the state of Somalia since the end of the Barre regime with warlords controlling spaces and resources.

In the case of Somalia, a combination of lack of adequate resources and its unfair distribution contributed to a large extent to the conflict. It is mainly Siad Barre's clan and at times sub-clan that benefited from resources and power. Scarce resources and its distribution has also been comparatively mentioned in other studies as having caused the genocide conflict in Rwanda in 1994 and ethnic clashes in Kenya (Ohlsson and Kahl, 1999).

The inherency and contingency theories of conflict (Mwagiru, 1999) also attempt to explore conflict origins. The inherency view argues that conflict is a normal and natural thing in society. It is embedded in the structural framework of society and just has to be managed by continuously shaping the environment to reduce it to manageable levels.

In the contingent view, people get into conflict situations not because of inherent factors, but because of the circumstances they find themselves in (Barash and Webel, 2002). In this view, conflict is not inevitable because it can be avoided by better information, less misperception and more rational behavior. The Inherency/Contingency debate is part of the discourses about power and its use in society. The Somali conflict demonstrates this further, pointing to the power relations during and after the Siad Barre regime by different groups seeking power and dominance over others (Dollard, 1939).

As argued by Gurr, the systems theory attempts to offer a holistic approach to conflict analysis (Gallo, 2012). It takes into consideration multiple factors that come into play to provide conflict such as context, issues, relationships, perceptions and outcomes. Strategies for conflict resolution will therefore be multi-pronged, multi-level and will reinforce the positive value of each other to examine the structural causes of conflict and its drivers.

2.4 Conflict analysis

An analysis of the conflict in South, Central Somalia examines the layers that inform the conflict and explores the underlying causes and secondary factors that fuel the conflict. It is important to analyze these factors in order to appreciate and then design appropriate mechanisms to deal with the conflict.

The aim of conflict analysis is to identify the type of conflict and its specific character. This then determines the range of interventions possible. In seeking to understand conflict and ways of resolving it, a framework through which conflicts can be analyzed is suggested by Sandole, (2003). The model focuses on the relationships and interactions between individuals, and between micro and macro levels of analysis, explaining the socioeconomic and political

elements that make up our worlds (Bartos, and Wehr, 2002). Sandole's theory however takes these variables in isolation of each other; this study suggests the need to integrate all the variables to achieve security.

In the field of conflict and conflict resolution, Burton, (1997) using a systems approach, explains that to deal with deep-rooted, intractable conflict at any level, one requires a comprehensive holistic framework to capture the complexity of conflict. He further argues against the breaking down of knowledge in the name of science and sees it as probably a significant reason for humanity's persistent failure to get solutions. People, therefore, tend to perceive situations in a limited context, to see limited remedies for problems and generally to reduce seemingly complex variables to simple propositions. This lack of holistic view obviously leads to superficial false and often damaging policy decisions and subsequently failure to solve problems (Burton, 1997, p. 130).

In complementing Burton's work, the peace researcher Galtung, had conceptualized indirect structural violence. He argues that the more intense the cause of gaps between potential and actual fulfillment of somatic and mental needs, the greater violence inflicted upon actors concerned (Galtung, 1969). This, he contends, is distinguished more from direct physical manifestation of violence. In situations of structural violence, therefore, the violence is built into the structure and shows up as unequal power and consequently as unequal life chances. The explanations advanced by Galtung are compatible with the work of Gurr, (1979) on relative deprivation. This is the felt gap between value expectations and value capabilities; the resources to which one feels entitled and resources one is capable of achieving and holding on to. The greater the relative deprivation experienced by the actors concerned, the greater the likelihood of political violence.

The actors on any conflict always seek to fulfill their basic human needs one way or the other (Burton, 1997). If they cannot do so within the existing (status quo) system they may create parallel, "revolutionary" systems for doing so. From a theoretical point of view the simple proposition is that if certain human needs are not satisfied in society there is a likelihood of conflict. The conflict will be of such a character that no suppressive means will contain it. Attempts to suppress it will lead, on the contrary to exponential increase in conflict thereby calling for some sort of resolution, (Burton, 1990 p.231).

2.4.1 Analyzing the Somali conflict

Analyzing conflict provides a system for examining the scope of a conflict by assessing the

parties to the conflict and the extent of their relationship to issues in contention. Identifying the parties to the conflict is essential in order to understand their positions, interests and capabilities. The process for conflict resolution can then be carried out by exploring strategies that respond to the origins of contention, for instance related to security, political, economic and social issues (Sandole, 2006).

Overall mapping of conflict entails essential information that is fundamental in planning a constructive response, including the control of violence (Wehr, 1979). Another important purpose of conflict mapping is to help opposing parties to distinguish their existing positions from their true interests and needs, while clarifying a variety of options for settling the costly struggles of conflict. Mapping methods of conflict can therefore be formulated to identify and assess key conflict actors particularly from the perspectives of:


1. Interests: values and underlying needs related to motives.
2. Goals: represented by purposes and aspirations.
3. Issues: derived from concerns about wellbeing.

All these factors play an important role in not only shaping conflict resolution strategies but also moulding dynamics linked to mutual relationships. Fig 2.1 below illustrates this relationship.

2.4.2 Conflict Analysis Framework

In analyzing conflict, the various variables inherent in the conflict are separated and intervention strategies can be devised.

Figure 1. Analysis Framework



Source: Workings with conflict: Fisher, S. Abdi, D. Ludin, J. Smith, R. & Williams, S. (2000)

2.4.3 Elements of analysis

Even though each conflict situation may be unique, indicators can be developed, to focus on relationship dynamics in a variety of contexts. Indicators reduce a complex reality to a few concrete dimensions. Each party may have its own perceptions of adversaries, goals, attitudes and behavior that differ from those of the adversaries themselves. In the exchange of each other's experiences, and perceptions, separate cognitive maps of the same situation represent different viewpoints (Fisher, 2000).

2.4.4 Parties

In actor analysis, mapping can focus on individuals or groups that are in a position to alter conflict dynamics in one way or the other. Efforts are made to figure out those who might be affected by the outcome of a particular conflict, as well as those who are currently concerned about the situation but have not become vocal. Each party has a different capacity to pursue his/her salient goals, articulate issues and express interests, as derived from different values and needs. Organized movements such as Al-Shabaab and ISIS have developed both armed resistance structures and political wings. Parties to the Somali conflicts have continuously evolved from the fractured clan groupings, to the Islamic Courts, then to Al-Shabaab and many others. Some groupings have died and re-appeared in different forms. The resolution scheme

must therefore take this into account while dealing with the current parties in conflict.

2.4.5 Differences

The complexity of the conflict will be increased if there are large numbers of views with different significance to the multiple parties in contention. Different layers of concerns can be divided into main issues and sub-issues that are analogous to the relationship between the trunk and branches of a tree. Some issues may reflect the roots of the conflict, while others the symptoms, being manifested in behavior. Such issues as identity, justice, respect and security are less tangible than those that stem from economic, material concerns. Relational issues in identity-based conflicts are frequently entangled with territorial or other tangible issues, (Bartos and Wehr, 2002). The differences in the Somalia conflict manifest themselves in different variables which point to the power relations amongst groups. They can therefore be grouped under various thematic areas and be dealt with as such in the resolution efforts.

2.4.6 Interests

Interests refer to the political, economic, occupational, and social aspirations of individuals and groups. Contradictory interests may be generated by competitive social situations that involve a high win-lose component. When competing motives are involved in acquiring scarce resources, the main question is how to make decisions on who gets what. The interests in the Somalia conflict are highlighted by the differences. The various concerns of each group or party to the conflict aggregates to power relations.

2.4.7. Value Differences

Values are anchored on shared concepts of desired ends and means to reach them. A scale of beliefs is adopted to define a range of acceptable and unacceptable behaviors with the creation of rules that constitute basis for mutual expectations. These norms guide individuals in an unfamiliar territory of social life (Brown, 1988). Our belief system influences the way in which we interpret the behavior of others and institutions. Efforts to convert and suppress other values might be part of a struggle in conflict. In oppressive situations, cultural values held by marginalized groups bestow a tool to protest the injustices of an imposed system (Freire, 1998). The Somalia social structure is centered on the clan. The lower the level down the clan, the less the value differences. Dealing with the numerous clan elements at the national level has more challenges yet the clan is the centre of gravity of the Somalia society, which makes it the right focus to address the Somalia conflict.

2.4.8 Human Needs

Compared to values, acquired through socialization, human needs reflect universal motivations. Basic needs are considered to be universal and primordial. The denial of identity, security and recognition is a critical and fundamental concern for most intractable conflicts in places such as Somalia. Human needs not subject to elite control are an essential element in the analysis of behavior and decision making (Burton, 2001). Such commonly sought needs as security, personal safety and development cannot be altered or undermined by authoritarian orders. When interests of parties are addressed it will automatically address the issue of human needs in Somalia. Overall, by securitizing Somalia every aspect of human need will be addressed.

2.4.9 Goals/Issues

In conflict situations, goals are defined as desirable future conditions that originally motivate the partisans to contest with each other. The pursuit of these goals entails cost, unless they are gained without any resistance. Goal incompatibility is created when conflicting parties exclusively seek the same thing. The demands expressed therefore may reflect long-term discontent that follows deprivation and frustration, based on the denial or loss of substantive rewards (Gurr, 1970). Each issue can be regarded as a point of disagreement to be resolved. They may resolve specific concerns that are associated with interests and values. Compared to many societies in Africa, the mono-ethnicity of the Somalia society presupposes conflict resolution would be simpler. However, issue differences among clans are so sensitive and deeply rooted that great attention must be paid by conflict managers.

2.4.10 Strategies/Styles

In coping with conflict, people employ particular styles, strategies, and tactics. A strategy serves as an overall plan for responding to a given situation. On the other hand a tactic is regarded as a specific observable action that moves a conflict in a particular direction in line with the strategy (Lulofs, and Cahn, 2000). The adoption of particular strategies is influenced by different styles and attitudes toward conflict.

The Somalia conflict resolution has been multipronged, such that local actors as well as international interventions have been involved. The major pledges with various interests have adopted different styles sometimes conflicting in nature. There is need for a coherent framework that brings all interested parties on board.

2.4.11 Colonial Legacy

There are a number of factors that caused and continue to drive the conflict in Somalia. These factors have to be analyzed in order to design an appropriate conflict resolution framework with strategies to address the key issues.

The conflict in Somalia can be traced to the colonial administration that divided Somalia into British Somaliland, Italian Somaliland (South-Central Region) and French Somaliland (Djibouti). This division resulted in inequity among clans (Osman, 2007), due to the different policies adopted by the Imperial powers.

The colonial enterprise was based on oppression and exploitation of the Somali citizens, a practice that subsequent regimes inherited. The ruling elites in Somalia since colonial times up to and after 1991 emerged from the Mudug and Majerteen clans. The colonial administration favoured clans that could deliver colonial interests and not necessarily the most capable individuals (Osman, 2007 p.101). This clan based nepotism would continue after independence. The existence of Somaliland territory that seeks autonomy from Somalia is a reflection of this colonial legacy, which tended to lump clans together as a sole ethnic entity.

Independence in Somalia came during the cold war. However, when Siad Barre came to power, he was alternately at one time allied to the West and at another time to the Soviet Union. Siad Barre played different powers to access resources that helped him build the largest Army in Africa then, (Abdulle and Ali 2007 p136). The same Army was used to kill Somali citizens and commit human rights abuses in the late 1980's up to the fall of his regime in 1991. The global disposition towards the post September 2011 US terrorism attack has continued to put Somalia in the spotlight after many failures by the international community to resolve the Somalia conflict. The presence of terrorist elements such as Al Qaeda, Al-shabaab and ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) has introduced an external dimension that is currently fused with internal conflict and political dynamics, hence the complexity of the conflict.

In summary therefore, the conflict in Somalia in general and South, Central region in particular, can be traced to the dictatorial tendencies of the Siad Barre and the sectarianism he created through clans. Subsequently, the conflict has become destructive with negative consequences for Somalia, including killing of innocent people, women and children. The conflict has intensified with new actors emerging complicating the resolution process because of ever changing issues driving it.

2.4.12 Governance and State Fragility

Conceptual approaches to the resolution of Somalias' conflict have been driven by the international community's desire to ensure that Somalis create some form of a central government. It is the hope that such an authority will bring the anarchical situation to an end. This argument is also recognized by Othieno (2007):19-40) but no particular attention is given to the root cause of the intractable conflict.

Coleman (2006:539) attributes the root cause of protracted conflicts to the existence of a severe imbalance of power between parties in which the more powerful parties exploit the less powerful. Additionally, Dweck and Ehrlinger (2006:43) state that prejudice (which is evident in the clan rivalries in Somalia) is the main cause of intractable conflicts. Oppression in the case of the Somali conflict, can be seen in Siad Barre's Marehan clan dominance over the Darod and Hawiye in South, Central Somali.

The security sector in Somali is still very weak and almost non-existent in some areas due to fragility of FGS. The weak government controls some parts of Somalia, while armed groups like Al-Shabaab control others (Farah, 2002). Access to justice is hindered by poor harmonization of formal and informal judicial systems. Laws are outdated and lack capacity to handle modern disputes. There are inconsistencies between dominant customary laws and formal laws. Formal justice system has been unable to effectively settle land disputes and is prone to corruption and lack of professionalism. There has not been a system of government that ensures equity across clans and regions. Absence of law and order in the country and the fact that many people grew up in a turbulent and chaotic environment where oppression and the use of the gun was very common, thereby making them unable to visualize a peaceful situation.

2.4.13 Competition for Power and Resources

Traditionally clans competed over water, livestock and grazing land. After independence, many people moved to cities where the resources needed for survival were different. The new competition would be about access to government jobs, public service, and control of foreign aid. Even before 1967 there were reports of corruption in the government and oppression of specific clans. It is on record that many clans fought over control of resources especially the port of Kismayu after the fall of Siad Barre in 1991. The warlords fought to control Mogadishu, Kismayu and Baidoa to access resources (Elmi, 2006).

The conflict over resources is epitomized by the conflict between the Hawiye and Darood clans

over the control of Juba and Shabelle river valley. (Elmi and Barise, 2006). Economically, Somalia performs poorly due to effects of a long war. Resource exploitation has therefore exacerbated the conflict. There have also been severe conflicts over land regulation and ownership. Siad Barre's government designed oppressive land laws that sought to appropriate idle and unregistered land. Land still remains a major source of conflict and disputes in Somalia today.

2.4.14 Resource Scarcity

Somalia's economy started to collapse even before the fall of the Said Barre Government in 1991. This resulted into loss of livelihoods for millions of people, neglect of infrastructure and breakdown of social services. There has not been any large scale and long- term investment in infrastructure and human development to revitalize the Somalia economy. Inequality in group development among regions and clans has also exacerbated the conflict due to ecological degradation among other factors, there has been a decline in access to water and pasture during dry seasons (UNDP, 2012 p, 62). This state of poverty has made people vulnerable and willing to engage in criminal activities as a means of survival, (Giordano and Wolf. 2005).

2.4.15 National Integration and Social Cohesion

Lack of National vision and identity is one factor that prevents clans from identifying themselves with National Government. There is no shared common vision of Somalia beyond the clan. Clan divisions still remain obstacles to National integration and stabilization. The Military rule of Siad Barre used excessive force and collective punishment on clans whose members defied his government (Osman, 2007). Since the opposition movements to Barre's rule were also based on clans, the departure of Siad Barre did not herald an era of a better Somalia.

Most of the fighting that has taken place in the country, apart from that waged by the Al-Shaabab, has been organized along clan lines. The construction of a national identity will be a long- term nation building project for any new government in Somalia (Ashley, 2011). The weak state has been unable to provide incentives for people to subscribe to the idea of homogeneous nation. Lack of national institutions and networks that run across clans or regions will continue to undermine the emergence of a strong national identity (Howard, 1996).

2.4.16 Clan Politicization

The clan forms a major marker of identity and societal values. The clan in Somalia is above

everything else, above political parties, religion and any ideology. Most social problems are addressed through the clan system. The clan is both a unifying and dividing factor. Every Somali traces his origin to the family, sub-clan or clan groups. The clans are divided into four major groups; Hawiye, Darood, Isaaq, Rahanweyn and a mixture of minor clans (UNDP, 2012 p.47). The other major societal divisions based on economic activities are pastoralists and sedentary farmers. The latter are weak and have often been victims of conflict. Clan and religious ideologies continue to play an important role in the Somali conflict. Somalia often subscribes to a clan formula of 4.5, which stands for the four main clans (Dawood, Isaaq, Rahanweyn and Hawiye) and the half (0.5) which stands for others (Somali - Bantus, Somali-Asians, and minor clans) who were marginalized from the mainstream politics. This clan formula is purely for power negotiation purposes that were designed during a peace process. Politics based on clans is one of the single most significant ideology that drive conflict in Somalia.

After the attempted coup against Siad Barre in 1978, he relied more on three sub-clans the Marehaan, Ogadeen and Dulbahante (MOD) coalition at the expense of other clans. This situation made other marginalized groups agitate for political change. To-date there is no viable governance structures that can guarantee all the clans equal treatment. There is no reasonable federal administration that can ensure social justice among all the citizens and regions. Further, the exclusion of traditional and clan elders from politics and security stabilization processes in the country are hampering conflict resolution

2.4.17 Youth Vulnerability

The majority of youth in Somalia are not included effectively in peace building and development due to illiteracy, lack of economic opportunities, unemployment, breakdown of family social ties and other cultural inhibitions. Over 70% of the youth in Somalia are under the age of 30 years. The average unemployment rate of the youth is 67% which is one of the highest in the World (UNDP 2012). These are mainly youth who grew up in the absence of a central government. They are illiterate and as a result have strong allegiance to their clans or religious groups. Such youth would do anything, including crime to protect their clans or religious groups.

Sources in Somalia indicate that poor parts of the society tend to turn towards criminal activities such as banditry, violence and other illegal activities, when there is political instability. Interviewed youth mentioned that when their fellow youths fail to get employment they start viewing themselves as rejected members of the society, lacking place in the society,

they feel weak, poor or unwanted and this draws them to other like-minded youth to form criminal gangs including organized armed groups.

2.4.18 War Economy

During conflicts, there emerge groups that profit from the conflict. These groups may not have any interest in seeing an end to the conflict since their lifeline might come to an end (Crocker, Hampson and Aall, 2009). During the long conflict in Somalia, there emerged groups engaged in illicit trade of small arms and light weapons and smuggling goods into neighbouring countries. Foreign companies' have also benefited from the absence of an effective Central Government as they have an easy and uncontrolled access to Somalia resources and never pay taxes. These companies are part of the problem as they always find peace spoilers and regional actors to support their selfish interests.

Control of strategic areas and assets by armed groups has also fuelled the conflict. For a long time, the Al - Shabaab controlled the port of Kismayo which generates revenue from exports and imports. It took the action of the Kenya Defence Forces to dislodge them from Kismayo in October 2011. These groups were certainly benefiting from the lawlessness in the country. Other international firms and business groups took advantage of this uncontrolled territory. Businessmen and individuals who benefit from the absence of a central government are drivers of conflict in Somalia. Some of these businessmen work in partnership with foreign countries to destabilize the country.

The business sector in Somalia under these circumstances established its rudimentary own security system of protecting property. If the government does not provide adequate security, this sector continues to operate parallel security networks. When security networks made up of militia are not engaged, they become a source of insecurity as warlords use them to control territory and exploit the local population.

2.4.19 Religious Fundamentalism

Islam is the main religion in Somalia and Islamic leaders are recognized for having contributed extensively to peace building and reconciliation efforts in the country. However, the existence of religious groups with competing ideologies is one of the factors contributing to conflict in Somalia today.

The majority of Somalis subscribe to the Sunni Islam sect and follow the Shafi School (Mahdab) of religious interpretation, which is relatively liberal (Lewis, 1994, p. 167). Radical

Islam began to emerge in the 1980s and was exacerbated by State failure in 1991 and external intervention from the UN, USA and Ethiopia. There are reports of Al-Qaeda and ISIS linkages to the Al-Shabaab extremist group currently fighting in Somalia.

The radical groups have tried to impose their radical religious ideology upon the society. Religious ideology in the Somali conflict is mainly dominant in areas where Al-Shabaab is in control. There are other Islamic groups operating in Somalia today such as Al-Sufiyya, Al-Islah, Ahlu-Sunnah Wal jamaa among others. Hizbul Islam also exists in some parts but does not practice extremist religious ideology and the group has supported successive interim governments. Due to application of Islamic laws, areas that were under the control of Islamic Courts Union (ICU) registered considerable improvement in Security. Al-Shabaab continues to impose strict Islamic law on the population such as banning Western music, books, television and even sports.

Due to the infiltration by foreign fighters, the ICU attacked even fellow Muslims who were opposed to them. This alienated them from the large Somali population. It is important to note that suicide bombings and religious radicalization of Somalia conflict began after the Ethiopia invasion in 2006. The Ethiopian incursion was viewed by many Somalis as a proxy war for the Christian West to fight Islamic influences in Somalia (Rohan, 2005, p. 72). Due to Somali sensitivity to foreign invasion and commitment to Islam, the Al-Shabaab witnessed increased local support.

Somali religious practices are highly influenced by the Somali culture. The goal of Al-Shabaab is to establish an Islamic state in Somalia and enforce Sharia Law. Religious conflict is exacerbated by the government's attempts to impose democracy in the country which is often not in line with the different religious groups' ideologies. As a result of this and due to lack of alternative societal guiding principles and values in the country, religious fundamentalism has taken root. These ideologies have connections with foreign actors in the middle-east countries. There is evidence that religious ideologies are mainly funded from the Middle East (UNDP 2012).

2.4.20 Armed Groups Involvement

There are many Organized Armed Groups (OAG) in Somalia. Many of these groups are sponsored by their clans, to provide security. The Harakat Al-Shabaab, Al Mujahideen (Movement of Youth Warriors) or Al-Shabaab is currently the main threat to security in Somalia. This movement sprung up as the armed youth wing of the Islamic Courts Union

(ICU). The group has since been operating as an independent movement. There are a number of regions in the rural areas controlled by the group. Its fortunes however, continue to dwindle after its sources of income such as port of Kismayo were taken over by KDF and handed back to the local administration. The Al-Shabaab though weakened, is still executing guerilla attacks mainly in urban areas.

Somalia emerged as a militarized society during the reign of Siad Barre. During the 1980s half of its GDP was spent on defence and security. Members of the Armed Forces sold their weapons to civilians during the economic hardships in the 1980s and state armouries were looted after the collapse of the government in 1991. There are also weapons provided by Ethiopia in support of some particular armed groups allied to it (Osman, 2007, p 110).

In 1992, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 733 calling for an embargo on weapons and military equipment being sent to Somalia. This embargo has been violated many times as there is no effective government or monitoring mechanism put in place. The supply of weapons continued mainly from Ethiopia, Eritrea, Yemen, Djibouti, Egypt and Sudan (Hogendoom et al 2003).

2.4.21 External Actors

The involvement of external actors in Somalia often drives the conflict although they are not the main causes of the conflict. These actors form alliances with local actors, and inform the conflicts trajectory. Foreign actors fuel the conflict in order to realize their interests. Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, United Kingdom, United States, and the Emirates are key actors in the conflict. The situation is made worse when Somalia does not have an effective Central Government that can enter into International treaties; hence the small regions controlled by warlords are easily manipulated by external actors (Elmi, 2010, p. 102).

According to the Royal Institute of International Affairs research on IGAD's contribution to regional security, some foreign countries have used Somalia as an ally due to its strategic location. Egypt wanted to use Somalia as a counterweight against Ethiopia. The USSR was mainly interested in Somalia's geostrategic location. The USA, Europe and Arab countries have replaced Egypt and USSR today. The global war on terror post 9/11 has put Somalia on the radar of the International Community particularly the West. Foreign actors finance local actors in the conflict to guard their interests. Religious groups have connections with their counterparts in the Arab world and other Muslim countries. Politicians advance the interest of the countries they are allied to. Arab countries fund religious groups while neighbours locally

and regionally safeguard their national interests. These factors form the complex web of the Somali conflict.

Different regions in Somalia have welcomed external actors who are friendly to their cause such as Ethiopia in Puntland and Somaliland and Kenya in Jubaland. These diverse relationships and antagonisms affect the nature of political solution to the Somali conflict. Genuine security threats inform the involvement of Kenya and Ethiopia as immediate neighbours and how Somalia's conflict impacts on their national interests. Ethiopia has been concerned about armed groups in Somalia which supported the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) such as Al Ittihad, Al Islamiya and the Al-Shabaab. Somalia has also become a playground for the proxy wars between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Eritrea would like to exploit Somali discontent with Ethiopia over intervention in Somalia politics and occupation of Ogaden to its advantage. Eritrea would also like to maintain good relations with Somalia due to its border dispute with Djibouti (Healy 2009)

2.5 Conflict Resolution Theory

There are many theories that attempt to explain conflict resolution, John Burtons conflict resolution theory and practice view conflict in different dimensions. The theory-practice-theory nexus that he tried to build contends that in conflict and conflict resolution, and implicitly in his systems approach conflict resolution, at all levels; that deal with deep rooted intractable conflict requires a comprehensive, holistic framework to "capture the complexity of conflict" (Sandole 1999). This is further amplified in Burtons violence explained (Burton, 1987; 1990 ab; Burton and Dukes, 1990 ab).

Reinforcing burtons view on holistic approach, Johan Galtung in his journal of Peace Research (1964) introduced a broader notion of violence. He contends that there are two forms, direct violence; where an individual or groups suffer physical or emotional pain as a result of direct action. Structural violence on the other hand is caused by the institutions and structures of society which result in inequality among individuals. Galtung further classifies peace into two forms, "Negative peace" and "positive peace". Negative peace is the perception of peace as an end to war. Positive peace includes not only the absence of war, but the absence of structural violence. It is the absence of violence in all its forms and as such has a greater value in the long term as it removes the factors which lead to direct violence. For the attainment of positive peace which is the most desirable, conflict resolution must therefore address the complex underlying structure of the conflict and deal with it in a holistic manner.

By applying the assumptions of John Burton's Conflict Resolution Theory, there are practical methods and processes that can be used to move from theory to practice. One of these processes is known as Track-Two Diplomacy. As defined by Montville (1991) Track-Two diplomacy is an unofficial, informal interaction between members of adversary groups or nations that aims to develop strategies, influence public opinion, and organize human and material resources in ways that might help resolve the conflict. One of the key phenomena that track-two diplomacy has been developed to deal with is protracted social conflict. This is a conflict that is based more on needs, particularly identity related needs of ethno-national or communal groups such as the clans in Somalia.

These identity groups, whether formed around shared religious, ethnic, racial, cultural or other characteristics, will act to achieve and ensure their distinctive identity within society. When they are denied physical and economic security, political participation, and recognition from other groups, their distinctive identity is lost and they will do whatever is in their power to regain it. In short, this is the origin of protracted social conflict.

In the protracted social conflict in Somalia, the Track-Two Diplomacy conflict resolution framework has not been employed effectively and subsequently this study has identified the gaps and made recommendations. Burtons three pillar framework (Sandole, 2006), makes clearer the possible role of potential third parties thus reinforces the use of Tract-Two Diplomacy conflict resolution method.

The first pillar, deals with the primary subject matter which addresses parties, issues, objectives, means, conflict-handling orientations, and conflict environments, as well as the historical, cultural, political, social, religious, institutional and other spaces within which conflict unfolds. (Sandole., 1999 pp. 16 - 17). The second pillar, deals with conflict causes and conditions. It comprises individuals, societal, international and global-environmental sources of influence on any conflict under pillar one. The third pillar, deals with conflict intervention, and includes initially third-party objectives; violent conflict prevention, management, settlement, transformation and finally resolution. It also includes third party means for achieving any of those objectives, such as competitive or cooperative processes; negative peace or positive peace and track one (Institution to Institution) and track - two actors and processes.

The idea advanced by Burton is that if conflicts expressed at any level (the first pillar) are complex in terms of their etiology (the second pillar), then efforts to deal with them (the third pillar) must capture that complexity as well (Burton, 1990). Framework is illustrated in Table 2.0.

Table 2.0 Burtons Three Pillar Framework for comprehensive conflict resolution

The three Pillar Framework Comprehensive Conflict and Conflict Resolution Mapping		
The second Pillar	The first Pillar	The third Pillar
Conflict causes and conditions Individuals (Basic Human Needs) Societal International Global/Environmental	Conflict Latent Parties Issues Objectives Means Conflict – handling Orientations Conflict Environments	Conflict intervention Third party objectives Conflict Prevention Conflict Management Conflict Settlement Conflict resolution Conflict Transformation <u>Third-party Approaches</u> Competitive vs Cooperative Processes Negative vs Positive Peace Orientations Track one vs Track two Actors and Processes Problem solving facilitation Conflict Resolution Workshops

Source: Conflict: Resolution and Prevention. Burton, J. (1990)

To identify trends and opportunities for the peaceful settlement of African conflicts we must first understand their root causes through analysis of the sources and root cause of these conflicts; what are the adversaries in the continent really fighting for? In general conflicts in African states are over three broad issues as this review has revealed.

First, there are the conflicts over resources, which may take two forms: the internal struggle over the distribution of national resources and collective wealth, or interstate conflicts over territories that are believed to contain valuable physical or mineral resources. In the first instance individuals and groups are competing for power over the allocation of such resources

or those seeking greater distributive justice within the state resort to violence. The security of the state is thus undermined.

Second, there are conflicts of identity in the struggle for self-determination. This is the case for Somalia for example where the pursuit of Somalia's national mandate to bring all ethnic Somalis under the umbrella of one republic pitches it against Ethiopia's need to preserve its territorial integrity.

Third, there are conflicts in Africa that concern ideology and competing sociopolitical systems and groupings that combine ideology, religion and politics. This results in a conflict that destroys the fragile foundation for national cohesion, national unity and domestic political stability.

In the case of Somalia, all the three elements i.e. Power, Identity and Religion are found in a combination that makes the conflict complex and its resolution therefore complicated. This calls for a more flexible theoretical approach that can suit the conflict circumstances. From the literature reviewed above classical conflict resolution theories may be too rigid to address the Somali conflict, hence the need for a hybrid comprehensive approach suggested in this study.

2.6 Theoretical Framework

Conflict resolution as a discipline has developed theoretical insights into the nature of conflicts, its sources and how it can be resolved through peaceful methods to effectuate sustainable peace. The nature of conflict will be found within the domain of conflict theory, while its sources will be within conflict analysis. Conflict resolution will be basically to explore ways of dealing with the issues in the conflict. This study was therefore anchored on the following two theories, and a conflict analysis model.

2.6.1 Conflict theory (Karl Marx)

This theory emphasizes the existence of opposing forces in the life of individuals, groups, social structures and society in general. This theory views human society as a collection of competing interest groups and individuals each with their own motives and expectations. The principle assumption underlying this theory is that all members in society do not have the same values, interests or expectation. These vary according to one's position, privileges, ability, class and wealth. Agreement tends to appear among those who share similar privileges. This is likely to encourage unequal distribution of the scarce but valuable resources and

opportunities. This results in divisions in society hostility and opposition. This explains the Somali conflict particularly when Siad Bare favored some clans above others.


2.6.2 Conflict resolution theory (Morton Devesch)

This theory contents that in conflict resolution a number of factors like the nature of the dispute and the goals each disputant aims at are pivotal in determining the kind of orientation a party would bring to the negotiation table in its attempt to solve the conflict. Two basic orientations exist. There are competitive and comparative Devesch. The type of which would occur between negotiating parties as a result of their disputing style. Cooperating disposition of the party would evoke an atmosphere of trust and eventually lead to mutually beneficial options of settlement. On the other hand, competitive approach leads to win-lose outcomes. This approach is inclined to intensify animosity and distrust between parties and is generally considered destructive. This researcher argues that in the context of a conflict, such as in Somalia both cooperation and competition are essential to some extent to effect resolution of the conflict since negotiating a desirable agreement always includes common and diverse goals thus findings a balance between the two approaches is the key to successful resolution of the conflict.

2.6.3 Theoretical Framework Design

Peace research is able to combine theories of conflict selected in this study and conflict analysis to help design a framework that will move a society in conflicts towards securing it.

Figure 2. Framework design for resolution of conflict



Source: Researcher (2017)

2.7 Conceptual Framework

The concept of security has continued to evolve in the post-cold war. Barry Buzan advances a redefined concept of security which is useful to this research. At the end of the cold war, security took a wider meaning as a socially constructed concept (Buzan, 1983). He defines security as the assurance of future wellbeing. On the other hand, Mroz (1980) considers security as the relative freedom from harmful threat.

More recently a United Nations report of the Commission on human security (2003) has underscored human security as protecting fundamental freedoms. It means protecting people from severe and widespread threats and situations. It assumes using processes that build on people's strengths and aspirations. It means creating Political, Social, Economic, Military and environmental systems that together give people the building blocks of survival.

In analyzing security, the individual represents the irreducible basic unit to which the concept of security can be applied. This can then be escalated to group and state or national security (Buzan, 1983). It is possible therefore to explore different understanding of security while still operating on the realism paradigm that does not challenge the view of the state as a central actor.

In trying to understand the broadened concept of security Buzan (1991), argues that with the decline of military threats in post-cold war, other threats were perceived. Some parts of the new security agenda, such as environmental sector were probably rising in importance, in the sense that the scale and momentum of damage being done to the planetary biospheres were accelerating at an alarming rate. Other security issues such as poverty were not new but had not been seen as issues requiring an urgent large-scale response during the cold war era.


To this end, Buzan would suggest that the concept of security needed to be opened up in two directions. The notion of security should no longer be limited to the military domain; rather, it should have a more general meaning that could be applied not only to the military realm, but also to the economic, societal, environmental and political fields. What needed to be secured, should not be conceptualized solely in terms of state, but should embrace the individual below the state and the international system above it (Buzan et al (1998). These other sectors therefore, by becoming "security" issues automatically gained a level of governmental attention and policy responses previously limited to military issues.

According to Buzan (1991a) therefore, the security of human collectivities was affected by factors in five major sectors: Military, Political, Economic, Societal and Environmental. Wholesome security is only achieved with securing the five sectors in society.

- (i) Military Security - Concerns the two-level interplay of the armed offensive and defensive capabilities of states and states' perceptions of each other's intentions.
- (ii) Political Security - Concerns the organizational stability of states, systems of government and ideologies that give them legitimacy.
- (iii) Economic Security - Concerns the access to resources, finances and markets necessary to sustain acceptable levels of welfare and state power.
- (iv) Societal Security - Concerns the sustainability, within acceptable conditions for evolution, of traditional patterns of language, culture and religious and national identity and custom.
- (v) Environmental Security - Concerns the maintenance of local and planetary biosphere as the essential support system on which all other human enterprises depend (Buzan, 1991a: pp. 19-20).

These five sectors are not seen as operating in isolation from each other, but inevitably interrelate and overlap. The result of their interaction in a conflict is a complex threat situation whose resolution is equally complex. This research adopts Buzan's idea to help design a conceptual framework to be used as a base for conflict resolutions as indicated in figure 3.

Figure 3 Sectorial approach to a holistic conflict resolution for human security



Source: Researcher (2017) from Buzans concept Buzan (1991a)

Based on Barry Buzan’s sectorial approach to security, this framework is deemed to be wholesome and will offer this study the logical framework from which to build a theoretical framework for adoption. The sectors overlap and intertwine in many ways, hence the need to address them concurrently with an effective central coordinating point. Fig 6.1 in this study illustrates the design of the framework.

2.8. Conflict resolution framework design


The theoretical framework that this research has been anchored on has been integrated with Buzans human security model to arrive at an intergrated resolution framework. During conflict analysis various issues are raised that require peace research to explore solutions. The overall implementation however is largely left to peace practitioners. Hence the need for an integrated resolution framework to address the Gap between peace research and peace practice

2.8.1 Intergrated Conflict Resolution Framework

By combining the theoretical and conceptual framework an intergrated conflict resolution framework can be designed. This design recognizes both peace research and peace practice that will produce a hybrid resolution framework deemed necessary for a holistic resolution to the conflict. Using their resolution framework with hindsight of the conflict analysis, findings

can therefore be summed up together in a hybrid conflict resolution mechanism from which a resolution implementation plan is formulated.

Figure 4 Intergrated Conflict Resolution Framework



Source: Researcher (2017)

2.9 Conclusion

The literature reviewed has delved into defining conflict and relating it to various theories of conflict. It is the underlying causes of the Somali conflict which need to be addressed. Theories of conflict resolution have also demanded the need for a holistic approach particularly when dealing with intractable conflict such as in Somalia. These theories have enabled this study develop both a theoretical and conceptual framework which when combined produce a conflict resolution framework that is deemed adequate to address such complex conflicts as in Somali

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.0 Introduction

This chapter provides the framework used in the research and has addressed the research questions outlined in chapter one. It further describes the research design, study locale the population targeted, sample size, the sampling procedures used, techniques of data collection, data analysis and ethical issues addressed. The chapter therefore organizes the research to ensure accurate data is obtained for proper analysis and sound findings in the subsequent chapter.

3.1 Research Design

The study adopted a descriptive survey design. This type of design determines and documents the way things are. Creswell (2003) observes that a descriptive research design is used when data is collected to describe groups, organizations or phenomena. It then uses a pre-planned design for analysis. This is significant to the outcome of this research because the solution to the Somali crisis lies in the Somalis and other stakeholders understanding their situation in depth and taking steps as recommended in dealing with the situation.

3.2 Target Population

This research drew samples from an accessible population within the different strata of the Somali communities. Ideally the researcher would have preferred a larger target population of Somalis but this was impracticable due to the security situation. The manageable population selected may however create a high likelihood of losing the generalization of the results, but is deemed as representative of the target population in the characteristics that appear most relevant to the study. This therefore validates the research sample.

3.3 Study Location

The location of the research site comprised the South, Central Somali comprising regions of Shabelle, Hiran, Bakool, Gedo, Bay, Upper and Lower Juba. This is where most of the conflict has occurred and is where AMISOM has deployed with its headquarters in Mogadishu. Data was also collected in the North eastern part of Kenya bordering Somalia in Mandera, Garrisa

and Lamu counties. These regions are inhabited by the Somali people from four major clans and a few minority clans. It is worth noting that the North and North Eastern parts of Somalia, (Puntland and Somaliland) are dominated by single clans and have been peaceful to the extent that they are seeking cessation and running own governance. This study did not extend to the two areas.

3.4 Sample Size

A sample is a small proportion of the target population selected for study (Mugenda and Mugenda 2003). The researcher in this study used purposive sampling. This population was based on targeted groups of people selected for their relevance to the study. The population groups included village elders, local leaders, security forces within AMISOM, government officials, local women leaders and religious leaders and the youth. A total of 175 respondents spread across the targeted groups were selected. Each of these groups were selected due to their relevance to the research objectives.

3.5 The Research Sampling Procedure

Sampling methods in research may yield probability or non-probability samples. In the former, the probability of selection of a respondent is known. This would be the most ideal, but is impractical in this study. The research sampling technique adopted was non – probability sampling. The sampling strategy sought to involve a number of respondents that would form a fair representation of the people affected by the conflict and those involved in the peace process.

The obvious disadvantage of non-probability sampling is that, since the probability that the respondent will be chosen is not known, the sample is not guaranteed to be a representative of the larger population. This limits the researcher's ability to generalize findings beyond specific sample studied. It is also difficult for the researcher to estimate the degree of departure from representation (sample error). The advantage of non-probability sampling, however, is that it is less complicated, less expensive and in Somalia less dangerous. This research was more inclined to perfecting the questionnaire than strictly in the sample.

3.6 Data Collection Techniques and Instruments

Data collection refers to gathering specific information focused on proving or disputing facts. (Kombo, 2006: p 89). The aim is to evaluate the extent to which observations are true or false in this case study. The instruments used to collect data include, questionnaires, observations

and focus group discussions.

3.7 Data Analysis

Qualitative technique was used where Primary data collected was summarized and interpreted discussion groups helped to fill in gaps through narratives. The narratives went on to reinforce experiences by respondents through questionnaires. Respondents were further asked whether they agreed or disagreed with a particular position or various aspects of conflict and possible resolution methods. The responses were summed up as absolute values. Once collected the data was analyzed using a descriptive statistical analysis. This was to enable meaningful description and distribution of scores using statistics. Each statistic used has a purpose and depends on the type of variable in the study.

3.8 Ethical Considerations

The study locale is in Somalia and considering the security situation, safety of both the respondent and the research assistants was given utmost priority. The respondents were told the truth and given all the facts about the research in order to make informed decision about participating or not. This was based on information regarding the purpose of the research, any foreseen risks, a guarantee of anonymity and confidentiality, identification of the researcher or assistants and any benefits/compensation or lack thereof. This was to ensure that the respondents who are disadvantaged in one way or another are not exploited or engaged without their consent. Above all the Al-shabaab militants often live among the population and any breach of confidentiality could have risked the lives of the respondents. This was given utmost attention. To maintain confidentiality only certain people conducting the survey knew the identity of the respondents. All the research assistance in the field in Somalia were members of AMISOM deployed for various assignments that brought them into constant interaction with the selected respondents. This made it easy for the assistance to build trust and confidence with the respondents.

CHAPTER FOUR

DATA COLLECTION, ANALYSIS AND PRESENTATION

4.0 Introduction

This chapter addresses data collection, analysis and presentation. The data was obtained from the field through qualitative methods. The instrument used to collect data was the questionnaire, reinforced by focused group discussions and interviews. Most of the data was from primary sources by information gathered directly from respondents and through observation. Secondary data was also obtained from literature and related studies by other researchers.

4.1 Data Presentation

The questionnaires were simplified to provide a YES or NO answer on selected areas of concern. The aggregate was then translated into percentages after giving them numerical values. The study administered 175 questionnaires divided into seven (7) thematic areas for preselected groups relevant to the study. A total of 130 questionnaires were properly filled and returned. This represents a 74.3% response rate. A response rate of 50% can be used to establish the research objectives and answer the research questions, according to Mugenda & Mugenda (2003). This implies that the response rate was appropriate. Data collected was narratively analyzed and formed the basis of the study's recommended action. Narrative analysis was mainly used. The results presented are in line with the objectives that are to explore causes of the Somali conflict and then determine appropriate measures to address the conflict. This will lead to developing a resolution matrix for the conflict. The results and findings are organized according to the overall thematic areas in the conceptual framework.

4.1.1 The Political Causes of the Somali Conflict


The study intended to explore how the struggle for control of the state, absence of good governance, structure of government, interest of external actors and western powers, affect strategies on the realization of a peaceful Somali. These statements were nominal in nature with respondents choosing 'Yes or No'. Table 4.1 presents these findings.

Table 4.1: Responses on the effect of governance

	Respondents	Yes	No	Total
i. Struggle for and control of the state brings political and economic power	20	8	2	20
ii. Absence of good governance	20	8	2	20
iii. Structures of government	20	17	3	20
iv. Interest of external actors	20	18	2	20
v. Western powers and economic support	20	18	2	20

Respondents generally agreed that struggle for control of the state which brings political and economic power has been a continuing source of conflict. Respondents also agreed that absence of good governance and experience with a repressive state have made Somalis suspicious of government. On the structure of government a big margin of respondents thought a strong central state would be suitable to enforce peace in Somalia. The interest of external actors such as neighbouring Kenya and Ethiopia was considered by a big margin of respondents to be derailing the peace process.

Figure 5: Response on the effect of governance



From the above analysis, the struggle for control of the state and the process of state-building consistently seems to exacerbate instability and armed conflict in Somalia as corroborated by Collier (2003). The revival of a centralized state structure tends to be viewed as a zero-sum game, creating winners and losers over potentially high stakes. Control over government by special clan groups would offer them opportunities to accrue economic resources at the expense of other groups, as well as to use the law and security forces to gain political dominance. That is why respondents observed that the absence of good governance and experience with a repressive state have made Somalis suspicious of government.

While Somalia needs state institutions and a successful peace process, prioritizing the building of such institutions higher on the agenda must be done cautiously even though respondents thought a strong central state would be suitable to solve the Somali conflict. It is important to distinguish between state institutions that, if controlled, can provide opportunities for specific groups to access increased economic and political power, and those that offer fewer or no such opportunities. While political institutions and public service institutions can be seen to represent opposing ends of such a spectrum, careful thought needs to be put in place to ensure that a future central government is to be minimalist and focused on the most essential functions, while leaving other tasks to local authorities and private sector (ICG, 2002).

4.1.2 The effects of Military on the Conflict

The study intended to explore the extent to which culture of militarization, continued proliferation of small arms, increased violence, disarmament and participation of militia group in peace process affects strategy on the realization of peaceful Somali. These statements were nominal in nature with respondents choosing ‘Yes or No’. Table 4.2 presents these findings.

Table 4.2: The effects of security on the conflict

	Respondents	Yes	No	Total
i. Culture of militarization of state organs to enforce law and order	19	17	2	19
ii. Continued proliferation of Small Arms transforms minor differences to intense violent conflicts	19	18	1	19
iii. Increased violence made clan elders lose influence of members while militia lost control of followers	19	17	2	19
iv. Organized and effective disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of combatants can transform conflict	19	17	2	19
v. Al-Shabaab group and other armed militia groups should be allowed into the peace process as stakeholders	19	18	1	19

Respondents generally observed that the culture of militarization of state organs to enforce law and order was the source of militia in Somalia

Respondents also agreed that continued proliferation of small arms transforms minor differences to intense violent conflicts. It was generally the view that increased violence made clan elders lose influence of members while militia lost control of followers.

The respondents further observed that organized and effective disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of combatants can transform conflict. It was also agreed that the Al-Shabaab group and other armed militia groups should be allowed to take part in the peace process as stakeholders.

The Somali state under Siad Barre was highly militarized and repeatedly resorted to military power to enforce law and order and to maintain legitimacy. This practice continued during the civil war that followed the fall of Barre. The complete breakdown of authority and the collapse of the Somalia army led to the proliferation of militias and weapons.

4.1.3 The Economic causes of the Somali Conflict

The research sought to establish the contribution of centre of commercial arteries, diaspora remittances and private sector activities on the realization of peaceful Somali. These statements were nominal in nature with respondents choosing ‘Yes or No’. Table 4.3 presents these findings.

Table 4.3: The Effect of the economy on the Somalia conflict

	Respondents	Yes	No	Total
i. The centre of commercial arteries like seaports and key Roads controlled by warlords, business groups and clans is a source of conflict.	19	17	2	19
ii. Diaspora remittances through (<i>Hawala</i>) money transfer system are funding warlords and fuels conflict.	19	18	1	19
iii. Private sector activities such as joint ventures protected by armed groups are cross-clans and may be a factor of conflict de-escalation.	19	17	2	19

Respondents generally observed that the centre of commercial arteries like seaports and key roads controlled by warlords, business groups and clans is a source of conflict. Respondents further observed that diaspora money remittances through traditional money transfer system (*hawala*) were funding warlords and fuels conflict. It was agreed that private sector activity

such as joint ventures protected by armed groups are cross-clans and may be a factor of conflict de-escalation.

The respondents observed that diaspora remittances through (*hawala*) money transfer system were funding warlords who contribute much to the conflict. Before the civil war broke out in 1991, Somalia was one of the poorest countries in the world with a high level of dependence on foreign aid. Its Gross National Product (GNP) per capita was US \$170 and its life expectancy was 47 years (Menkhaus, 1997). Because of Somalis' strategic importance, it received foreign assistance alternately from the Soviet Union and the United States. This enabled Siad Barre to build a bloated bureaucracy and military, which could not be sustained after the end of the cold war and precipitated the collapse of the Somali State in 1991. The immediate aftermath of state collapse saw a rise in the economy of plunder and the emergence of warlords struggling for control of power and resources. A key outcome of the looting militia was violent conflict and entrenchment of vested economic interests that benefited from the lawlessness.

The conflict in Somalia has had a negative impact on the traditional modes of production such as livestock farming the mainstay of a pastoral economy. Coupled with environmental degradation and draught, the fragility of the economy was greatly increased, creating large scale poverty, with long-term detrimental consequences.

The conflict in Somali has resulted into a dependency syndrome, whereby Somalis in the diaspora have to send money to sustain the relatives at home. Remittances from the Somali in the diaspora are estimated to be about US\$700 – 800 million each year (UNDP and W/B 2003). A significant portion of the remittances is used to support relatives mostly in urban areas and a smaller amount serves as investment for private sector activity. While these remittances have played an important role in sustaining a large population, its negative impact is that it creates a dependent population. This group could be badly affected as the second-generation of Somali-diaspora shielded from the conflict does not have the same incentive to remit funds to support relatives. Remittances may also be used to sponsor conflict and promote warlords, particularly when the clan is under threat or attack. Diaspora elite and their local parties may not want to support conflict but many seem content with the privileges accorded to them by the civil war, such as misappropriation of properties (CRD, 2004).

The consumption of Qat (Khat) a stimulant hallucinating plant, increased after the outbreak of the civil war. Combatants chewed it to reduce battle fatigue and fear, while non-combatants chewed it to stay calm in the face of violent conflict and uncertainty. Over time it was a widespread addictive habit. Addiction to Qat leads people to become mentally incapacitated,

distressed and disinterested in work or family. From an economic perspective, it reduces productivity and income levels, diverts hard currency to neighboring countries, because Qat is not cultivated in Somalia, and in many cases leads to abandonment of livestock husbandry which is a major economic activity. Warlords have an incentive to keep the population addicted to this drug because it presents a huge source of revenue for them. It is estimated that flights carrying Qat shipments to Mogadishu generate about US \$ 170,000 each month, which is divided among owners, airstrip authorities and warlords (W B report 2002).

The control of commercial arteries (Ports) in Somalia is a huge source of revenue. Those in control levy duties and struggle to control the seaports. This has led to recurring conflicts between warlords and armed groups. The revenue thus collected is also used to buy arms and further escalate the conflict. The warlords are also responsible for piracy which is rampant within the Somali waters and beyond. The ransom paid to the pirates further goes to the purchase of arms fueling the conflict.

4.1.4. The Social Causes of the Somali Conflict

4.1.4.1 Gender

The study intended to find out the role played by women in the fighting during the civil war. The role of women in the context of the clan during the fighting and whether cross-clan marriages had any effect on inter-clan hostilities. These statements were nominal in nature with respondent choosing 'Yes or No': Table 4.4 presents these findings.

Table 4.4: Gender and the Somalia conflict

	Respondents	Yes	No	Totals
i. Somali women have suffered more in war than the men	20	18	2	20
ii. Have Somali women played an active role in promoting peace and reconciliation in the conflict	20	18	2	20
iii. Can women in Somalia unite beyond clan boundaries?	20	18	2	20
iv. Education for women in Somalia would empower them to leadership roles in peace-making	20	18	2	20
v. There are a number of cross-clan marriages, does this increase or reduce conflict in society	20	18	2	20

Respondents generally observed that Somali women have suffered more in war than the men. Respondents also affirmed that Somali women have played an active role in promoting peace and reconciliation in the conflict. It was disagreed that women in Somalia can unite beyond clan boundaries and that education for women in Somalia would empower them to leadership roles in peace-making. It was also observed that there are a number of cross-clan marriages, which reduces conflict in the society

From this analysis, it was noted that in the Somalia society it is men, specifically elders, who traditionally have the means to make peace through dialogue and mediation (Falza, 2001). Although women are typically excluded from decision-making forums, where peace accords are negotiated, their position within the clan system gives them the ability to narrow clan divisions and they can act as a bridge to clan divisions and as a first channel for dialogue between parties to a conflict.

Women have also been effective in influencing elders and other actors to intervene in conflict and mobilized resources to finance peace meetings and support demobilization. While men typically focus on achieving a political settlement with the assumption that peace will ensue,

women’s vision of peace exceeds this and includes sustainable livelihoods, education, truth and reconciliation. With the collapse of the Somali state, women lost legal status and equal rights that had been afforded them. While women actually engaged in peace-activities, the gendered nature of clan based politics means that women are typically mostly excluded from full participation in peace talks.

4.1.4.2 Religion

The study intended to explore how the difference between Islam and Political Islam, social transformation, courts of Islamic union, political Islamic extremism and armed groups propaganda affects the realization of a peaceful Somalia. These statements were nominal in nature with respondents choosing ‘Yes or No’. Table 4.5 presents these findings.

Table 4.5: Effects of religion on the Somali conflict

	Respondents	Yes	No	Total
i. Is there a fundamental difference between Islam and Political Islam?	20	18	2	20
ii. Somalis training in foreign religious Institutions brought Social transformation regarding Islam and Political Islam	20	18	2	20
iii. Do you think Courts of Islamic Union were useful in bringing some Peace and Order in Somalia during their time?	20	18	2	20
iv. Do you think the categorization of political Islamic Extremism is unnecessarily distorting the true nature of Islam?	20	18	2	20
v. Do you think various armed groups in Somalia have turned religion into tool for propagating power by urging Jihad?	20	18	2	20

Respondents generally agreed that there is a fundamental difference between Islam and political Islam. Respondents further agreed that Somalis training in foreign religious institutions brought social transformation regarding Islam and political Islam.

It was generally agreed that courts of Islamic union were useful in bringing some peace and order in Somalia during their time. However, the respondents agreed that the categorization of

political Islamic extremism is unnecessarily distorting the true nature of Islam. Various armed groups in Somalia have turned religion into a tool for propagating power by urging *jihād*.

4.1.4.3 The Clan factors

The study intended to observe the effects of clan dynamics in the Somali conflict. How clan fight for the control of power and resources, and how different clan groups can co-exist.

Table 4.6 The clan factor in the Somali conflict

		Respondent	Yes	No	Total
i.	Nearly all conflicts in Somalia today break out along clan lines deliberate	20	18	2	20
ii.	Manipulation rather than clan identities creates and drives conflict	20	18	2	20
iii.	Clan identities and flexibility can be used by leaders to control power and resources	20	18	2	20
iv.	Clan groups can serve as destructive forces and traditional conflict moderations	20	18	2	20
v.	Cross-clan partnerships through CSO and local initiatives can lead to development and trusted peace building	20	18	2	20

Respondents generally agreed that nearly all conflicts in Somalia today break out along clan lines. Respondents also agreed that manipulation rather than clan identities creates and drives conflict. It was further observed that clan identities and flexibility can be used by leaders to control power and resources.

The respondents observed that clan groups can serve as destructive forces but also as traditional conflict mediators. Cross clan partnerships through CSO and local initiatives can lead to development and trusted peace building.

4.1.5 The Environmental causes of the Somali Conflict

The research also sought to establish the contribution to the conflict of environmental factors such as the linkage between environment and conflict in Somalia, control of access to pasture

land by some clans, massive charcoal production for export, effect of widespread dumping of waste in the Somalia coastal region affecting the livelihood of people living along the coastline and the ever diminishing water resources. These statements were nominal in nature with respondents choosing ‘Yes or No’. Table 4.7 presents these findings.

Table 4.7: The Effect of the environmental factors on the Somalia Conflict

	Respondent	Yes	No	
i. Do you think there is linkage between environment and conflict in Somalia?	12	10	2	12
ii. Do you think control of access to pasture land by some clans is source of conflict?	12	11	1	12
iii. Is massive charcoal production for export in Somalia fuelling conflict	12	10	2	12
iv. Does widespread dumping of waste in the Somalia coastal areas affecting livelihood of people living there	12	9	3	12
v. Do you think the ever diminishing water resources are causes conflict between clan	12	10	2	12

Respondents generally agreed that there was a linkage between environment and conflict in Somalia. They also agreed that the control of access to pasture land by some clans is the source of conflict. The respondents agreed that the massive charcoal production for export in Somalia was fueling conflict. The widespread dumping of waste in the Somalia coastal areas and the ever diminishing water resources was affecting the livelihoods of the people living along the costal line and were the causes of conflict between clans respectively.

The linkage between the environment and conflict is manifest in Somalia (Dabelko et al 2004 p 316). Further, the fragmentation and loss of statehood has provided fertile grounds for merchants of dumping, unregulated and unsuitable users of natural resources. These conditions, coupled with the widespread violence that affected agricultural production as well as the hostile and harsh environment brings to the fore environmental concerns that must be addressed or sustainable peace will remain elusive.

4.2. Summary findings

The objective of the study was to develop a holistic conflict resolution mechanism for the South, Central Somali conflict. This was to be done by establishing the underlying causes of the conflict, determining appropriate measures to address them and designing a resolution framework. In this regard the study employed a conflict analysis tool and human security model under the five thematic areas ie; Political, Economic, Societal, Security and Environmental, and summarizes the findings as follows:

4.2.1 Political Sector

Despite the multiple setbacks suffered in the past political reconciliation efforts in Somalia, a number of responses from the questionnaires and discussions conducted have pointed out to the lessons learnt that may be infused in future resolution efforts. Somalia ownership of the peace process is critical. Negotiations cannot be driven by external actors or they quickly lose legitimacy. Somalia ownership means that Somalis themselves must determine agendas, timetables and procedures. They must be helped to do so. In addition to this, the peace process should tap into traditional Somalia reconciliation practices, especially the essential practices of having negotiators extensively vet positions with their constituencies; this will stand a better chance of success. National reconciliation process in Somalia need to combine the most effective traditional mechanism, conventional conflict resolution processes and contemporary peace initiatives.

During negotiations representation of parties to the conflict will always be deeply contested no matter how it is determined, some system of representation must be adopted that is seen to be fair. Some mediators have in the past given preference to militia leaders in the belief that since they control the guns, they control the power; or to tradition and civil society leaders in the hope that grassroots representation is more legitimate. The *Mbagathi* conference in 2002 – 2004 is a reflection of this. The reconciliation process cannot and must not be reduced to power sharing deals by political elites. This approach has repeatedly failed leading to breakdown of reconciliation efforts.

If the establishment of transitional government is an unavoidable component of peace accords to extricate Somalia from its crisis of state collapse, external mediators and donors must press Somali leaders to focus on executing key transitional tasks like building governance and political structures rather than building maximalist security states.

The mediators must also have a clear strategy to understand and manage spoilers to the peace process. This includes intrinsic spoilers-warlords and others who have no interest in allowing a revival of central government. Others are situational spoilers whose objections to a peace process have to do with specific aspects of the accord, or power sharing arrangements. In this regard, creating political space for opposition parties would allow groups unhappy with aspects of an accord or transitional government to voice their objections, without becoming rejectionist opposing the entire process.

Finally, it is essential to quickly develop better security arrangements to support the political reconciliation process without allowing warlords to tilt the negotiating balance in their favour by demonstrating potential use of force.

4.2.2 Economic Sector

Economic factors contribute much of the conflict in Somalia. Rival factions continually struggle to control land, natural resources and trade which generates revenue. Before its collapse in 1990-91, the Siad Barre regime had used a combination of socialist-style legislation, international military and relief assistance, and political nepotism in an effort to capture the country's major economic assets and concentrate economic power at the centre. The federal government must now address the issue of centralized power and resources, and embrace concept of devolving power to the federal states.

After 1991 victorious factions competed to take control of urban and rural assets that had enriched the supporters of the old regime. Different militia seized key ports and airstrips and imposed tributary regimes over many of the productive districts. All assets that were seized by military and clan groups must be reviewed; those that belong to government must be surrendered and distributed to the devolved units appropriately.

Since the collapse of the state, the quest for economic security and power took place at local and regional levels. Every social aspect had an economic component, from imposition of roadblocks, along strategic transport routes, to piracy activities off the coast, and efforts by competing religious movements like Al-Shabaab to seize control of village courts. To address this, sound economic policies and structures must be developed to grow the economy from grass root level, through legal means.

The Somali economy collapsed even before the fall of the Siad Barre government in 1991. This meant loss of livelihoods to millions of people, neglect of infrastructure and breakdown of

social services. There has been severe threat to food security with the famine taking place in 2011. There has not been any large scale and long term investment in infrastructure and human development to revitalize the Somali economy. Inequality in group development among regions and clans has also exacerbated conflict (*United Nations Development Programme*), (*UNDP*) *Human Development Index, (HDI) Somalia, 2012 p62*). The result of this is poverty which sometimes makes people vulnerable and willing to fall into crime as a means of survival. A comprehensive economic recovery programme must be developed for Somalia. The International community needs to come together and develop a marshall plan to urgently address the Somali problem. Without economic recovery, Somalia will continue to be raged by conflict.

During the long conflict in Somalia, there emerged groups engaged in illicit trade of small arms and light weapons and smuggling goods into neighbouring countries. In such circumstances foreign companies benefit from the absence of central government as they have an easy and uncontrolled access to Somali resources and never pay taxes. These companies are part of the problem as they always fund spoilers and regional administrations to rubber-stamp their selfish interests. The Federal government must address the issue of illicit trade and censor external companies involved. Combining its national apparatus and international security support groups only legal trade must be allowed.

The Al-Shabaab for a long time controlled the port of Kismayu in the South East of Somalia, until they were dislodged by the KDF in October 2011. This group has among its agenda, the benefit from the lawlessness in the country. These groups and businessmen who benefit from the absence of an effective authority in control of Somali are driving the conflict. The Al-shabaab group be dismantled by both use of persuasion and coercion. They must be reintegrated back into society to continue living like all other citizen of Somalia doing legal trade and commerce.

Piracy, too, has been a major threat to maritime security in Somalia. The government in the Puntland region and south, central Somalia has not been able to prevent pirates from operating within their territories. Piracy thus becomes a lucrative criminal enterprise supported by some clan leaders. This has raised the cost of maritime trade security to an all-time high (Martin, N. 2007). The Federal Government through its security agencies in collaboration with the international community must address piracy within the Somali waters.

The Somali business people, both within and outside have played an important role in Somali's recent troubled history. At some point they have hindered efforts at reconciliation by financing

warlords and their militias and others supporting Sharia courts. The wealthy and well-connected members of the business class have the most influence on policy. Business people bankrolled rural warlords and facilitated the flow of weapons and other war material into the country. At the same time, the private sector filled the major void left by the collapse of the national banking and telephone systems by investing in money transfer (*Hawala*) and telecommunications enterprises. They supported private schools, both for religious and technical education, and helped pay the salaries for security personnel to keep the ports operating. The government must continue to encourage Somali business people both local and in the diaspora to conduct clean business. Measures must be put in place to monitor money movement and business enterprise to ensure they are legal.

In many parts of Somalia, it appears that economic recovery has always led political recovery, despite the widespread belief that political reconstruction ought to come first. Evidence suggests that the international donor communities along with most Somali politicians have their priorities wrong; they have invested more in trying to find political solutions first. This is always the most difficult thing for Somalis to achieve hence more energy and resources should be put into building on what Somalis do best, that is responding to economic opportunities. The Somalis are known to be very vibrant and aggressive in business. Focusing on economic recovery may reduce insecurity and allow political discussions to occur in a relatively less volatile environment. The international donor community must, within its plans focus on supporting enterprises that will spur economic growth in Somalia and attract foreign investment.

It is suggested here that perhaps the international community should look for ways of building political consensus on the foundations of economic security, rather than vice-versa. Somalis' economic entrepreneurs rather than its political ones may be the key to stability and security in the country.

Some of the economic innovations in Somalia are simply the result of necessity, the efforts of Somalis to adapt and survive in an unpredictable political environment. Given the many challenges, it may appear that Somalis economic entrepreneurs have little chance of altering the current political trajectory in Somalia. However, if the limited economic recovery led by the private sector continues to expand, more people will find an alternative to the economy of predation and may come to have a stake in the predictable and peaceful flow of goods and services.

If Somalis find better economic security in their markets than in their militias, they are more

likely to bring pressure on their leaders to support a regime of law and order. The creation of a peace constituency anchored in an expanding economy may take long and will require continued cooperation of regional and international actors.

4.2.3 Societal Sector

The Somali society is homogenous in terms of religion culture and language. The overwhelming majority of the population interviewed, particularly those who have been fighting, have minimal differences. Most of the fighting from 1991 onward has occurred among heavily armed Somali clans, in particular along clan lines, although some unarmed clans have also been affected (Elmi, A. and Barise, A. 2006). The clan system is synonymous with Somalia and cannot be wished away. Its positive aspect should be explored to include clan leaders in all decision making particularly in matters that affect their clan members either at the local, federal or national level.

The system of governance that the Somalis have adopted and the management of the ever divisive group identities has been a major challenge for peace-builders. The clan seemingly overrides everything else. It is above political parties, religion and any ideology. Somalis are divided along clan families and sub-clans that are based on patrilineal segmentary lineage. Clan identity is fluid in nature; ones' identity depends on whom one is communicating with at the time (Lewis, M. 1961). Clan identity is so important for Somalis, since it functions both as an insurance system as well as fulfilling a psychological and emotional need for belonging. In the Somali civil war, clan identity acts as a mobilization instrument, one that affects the effort of building durable peace. The different clan areas with different natural resources can be harnessed for economic development based on clan strengths, understanding and interactions. The clan leadership must be actively engaged and made part and parcel of governance particularly at the devolved units. This will not only give legitimacy but involve them in decision making for the resettlement of their people. The clan leadership will also mediate disputes with other clans.

Somali people consider the clan at the centre of their relationships. It is the main characteristic that they use to recognize each other. Since all Somalis are Muslims, they generally believe clan identity is what defines an individual in society. The Holy Koran proclaims, "We made you into nations and tribes so you can recognize each other (Surah 49:11)". Identity is a human need (Burton, J. 1990). Among the Somalis it is the most important for the individual. It is similar to life insurance. Members of clans come together during both happy and difficult times. When one of their members is getting married they provide assistance. Similarly, when

one of them is killed or injured or dies from a natural cause, members of their clan come together and support each other. Most problems are addressed within the clan organization. The clan is both a uniting and dividing factor. Since there are no viable governance structures that can guarantee all the clans equal treatment, there is no viable federal administration that can ensure social justice among all citizens and regions. To this end therefore inclusion of traditional and clan elders in politics and security stabilization process is significant in ensuring peace and stability.

Traditionally, nomadic contests such as the one in Somalia lack an authority that can enforce agreed-upon laws or common-sense requirements. Such a situation makes clan identity the last refuge that one uses in order to safeguard one's life and property. After the state collapse in 1991, the use of clan identity as an insurance policy became even more important. Many Somalis were forced to leave their home cities due to other clan's claim. Those Somalis who left had to move to areas in which members of their own clan had settled. The clan does not only come together when a member of a given group kills a person or one of them is killed. They will help each other in a variety of ways. They collaborate when watering large numbers of livestock, in supporting a poor member, or when a group needs to dig a well. A new phenomenon in recent times is that clans and sub-clans have held fundraising events to open schools and universities in their cities. The University of Kismayu was reopened through such collective efforts by clans. Such positive clan activities must be recognized, supported and encouraged.

Religion has an important role in the Somali society. Islam is the main religion in Somalia and Islamic leaders are recognized for having contributed a lot to peace building and reconciliation efforts in the country. However, the existence of religious groups with competing ideologies is one of the factors contributing to conflict in Somalia today as interviewed religious group leaders testify.

These radical groups have tried to impose their radical religious ideology upon society. Religious ideology in the Somali conflict is mainly emphasized where Al-Shabaab and other extremist groups are dominant. The Al-Shabaab and by extension the Al-Qaeda want to enforce a foreign brand of Islam and to rule the country. Due to lack of alternative societal guiding principles and values in the country as a result of conflict, religious fundamentalism has taken root in the country. These ideologies have connections with foreign actors in the Middle Eastern countries. The government and all the stake holders must address the issue of extremism, through dialogue, education and law enforcement. Respected religious leaders

must be given room and empowered to moderate religious practice that accommodates all without prejudice. Extremist groups must also be encouraged to tone down through persuasion and education.

Some of the religious practices are highly influenced by the Somali culture. The goal of Al-Shabaab is to establish an Islamic state in Somalia and enforce Sharia Law. Religious conflict is exacerbated by the government's attempt to impose democracy in the country which often is not in line with the different religious groups' ideologies, Socio-economic and cultural orientations. There is need to balance religious, culture and system of governance. A hybrid system that recognizes religious laws and culture practices must be encouraged.

The impact of the Somali conflict is manifested in various ways including, breakdown of families, destruction of the economy, division within sub-clans, destruction of government institutions, lawlessness and religious divisions, destruction of institutions, encouraging human and capital flight, undermining investors' confidence, spreading disease and disrupting trade. Trust and confidence has been severely eroded. An increasing number of the population views the implementation of the federal system and movement or rotation of the capital city to other regions as one of the solutions to the prolonged conflict in the country. This should be given more thought and discussed further during national dialogue to pick what is best for the majority of Somalis.

There are very many cases of un-addressed war crimes, deep inter clan grievances over atrocities committed, massive levels of stolen property and occupied territory, unresolved property disputes, impunity, looting of public goods and state properties. Cultural and moral decay, hatred, clanism which has replaced central government for average citizens, insecurity, unaccountable leaders who serve foreign actors, and widespread injustice and abuse of human rights are the hallmark of Somalia today. Although it will take time to address all wrongs that happened, the idea of truth, justice and reconciliation (TJR) can not be ignored. Somalis must be encouraged to address among themselves all the evil past and move forward in the spirit of reconciliation that will be acceptable to them.

Literacy levels in Somalia are low due to continuous fighting that has disrupted schooling. The country is dependent on food aid for almost half of its population. About 27% of the total population or an estimated 2 million people face acute food and livelihood crises annually. Somalia is also the largest source of refugees in the world (*UNDP Human Development Index report, Somalia, 2012, p57*). The refugees have been a source of insecurity to the neighbouring countries; therefore Somalia is a problem both to its citizens, neighbours, and the international

community. This is the more reason why concerted effort is needed by all stakeholders to right the Somali wrongs. The government must be supported, to settle all displaced people, encourage those refugees to return, support education programmes and resettle displaced persons.

Civil society in Somalia is made up of the traditional structures and modern urban based non-governmental organizations. Traditional elders have continued to broker peace among clans and to lead in voluntary disarmament. Civil society has also been heavily involved in peace processes. Some religious based organizations have also continued to provide humanitarian aid, spiritual guidance and mediation in local disputes. The structure that civil society organizations have put in place must be supported, to continue serving the Somali people in various needs. The CSO's must be allowed space to operate in a transparent manner.

This Somali diaspora has been the backbone of the local economy through remittances, which the World Bank estimates at about US\$ 750,000 annually using the *Hawala* System (Abdulkadir, 2007 p254). The diaspora does not only bring money but also a work culture, knowledge and skill from abroad. The Somali diaspora has been a key element in attempts at formation of the new administration in the country. This group must be engaged continuously and be allowed space in the resolution of the conflict. They must also be encouraged to start businesses enterprises to uplift the Somali economy. The involvement of these diaspora groups in national issues may water down the rigid clan outlook to affairs and offer alternative thinking to reconciliation.

The role of women in the Somali peace process is very critical. Excluded from the all-male arena of clan-based politics, women have directed their collective political acumen and energy into the civil society space that opened up after the state collapse. Inspired by their involvement in the Beijing conference on women in 1995, women in Mogadishu in 1996 built on their own growing experience in cooperating for peace. They established the coalition for grass roots women organization as a platform for peace building that united women's voices and efforts (Jama, 2010). In theory, at least, international support has afforded women civil society activists an entry point into externally-sponsored peace processes, which had previously largely been a male preserve. In the *Arta* Conference in Djibouti and the *Mbagathi* conference in Kenya, women made inroads with their participation and representation. The *Arta* conference coincided with the adoption of the UN Security Council resolution 1325 on women, peace and security. This stresses the importance of women on equal participation and full

involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security and the need to increase their role in decision making with regard to conflict prevention and resolution.

Somali women-led civil society organizations have achieved much in the past two decades. They have at times helped to disempower the warlords, reduced the significance of clan affiliation and ensured civil society representation which is essential to any peace and reconciliation process. Although they have generally made progress on the participation of women in politics, the Somali women still face constraints in breaking through gender-based inequalities and cultural practical barriers to equal political participation. The government must encourage women participation across the divide and should promote women and girls education to bring them into the centre of Somalia affairs.

It is commonly said in Somalia that while women can build peace only men can make it. One reason for this is that a woman's affiliation with her father's clan and her mother's means that a woman's clan loyalty is perceived as unpredictable. They therefore are not included as clan delegates in negotiations and decision-making forums that can affect their fortunes. By the same token, a woman's multiple clan affiliations can give her a structural role as a peace-builder enabling her to act as a conduit for dialogue between warring parties and to exert pressure on them to keep talking. Their participation at all levels must be encouraged in the peace process

When mobilized, women play an important influencing role in local peace processes especially if they have wealth, are related to respected clan elders or come from a respected family. In discussions with women respondents a story was narrated of how elder women in Puntland from several clans approached the elders and demanded a cessation of hostilities. Their message was simple; we have had enough displacement in our lifetime and at this age we can't tolerate it anymore. This mobilized the clan elders and leaders to intervene and ensure the local conflict was peacefully resolved.

4.2.4 Security Sector

Somalia remains a battle ground for warlords, clan militia and religious groups with fundamentalist leanings. The state collapse has lasted long enough to the extent that it has acquired a semblance of normalcy. The Somalia debate can be disaggregated into three distinct crises: that of collapse of the central government, protracted armed conflict and lawlessness. Over the past years the conflict has become more localized and less bloody while criminality is constrained by customary law and private security-forces. The emergence of Islamic extremist

groups with attachment to other global Islamic fundamentalists has created a new dimension to the conflict. The militia and other armed groups must be degraded, disarmed, demobilized and integrated into society (DDR).

An important feature has been the emergence of a variety of Islamic movements seeking to establish an Islamic state in Somalia. These have been in the form of traditionalist *Sufi* orders, to progressive Islamic movements like Al-Islah, and Al-Shabaab pursuing a regional or global agenda. The fundamentalist group, Islamic State for Iraq and Syria (ISIS) with a global Jihad agenda is currently operating in Somalia in collaboration with Al-Shabaab. These groups must be dealt with by the security agencies and government through dialogue and force.

The international environment has also changed with time from the Cold War to the Global War on Terror which impacts directly on the crisis and international responses to it. This poses a problem for Somalis and international actors working to build peace. Initiatives that may have appeared to offer a solution in earlier years may no longer be applicable and there is a risk of fighting yesterday's war or building yesterday's peace today. The war on terror should not be seen to be external actors fighting Somalis particularly the US instead the US should support the government and government agencies involved in dealings with the groups.

The Al-Shabaab movement has both a political and religious agenda. It draws support from a large section of the Somali community. If engaged constructively it may present part of the model for the solution to the Somalia conflict. Despite the fact that, like some warlords who are engaged with the government, the movement has committed acts of large scale violence as it claims its global war against the United States and its Allies. The question of exploring positive engagement with them should be considered more in the conflict resolution framework. Starting with the moderates and the defectors on effective rehabilitation programme for those who surrender or wish to must be included.

The Al-Shabaab in its formative stages had a youth agenda and a cross-clan ideology. It is an individual social movement with a political voice in Somalia and a contestant in the international community. As with many other Islamist organizations in Somalia, Al-Shabaab refers to the Quran to emphasize the difference between contemporary society and the society of the original Muslim community (Elmi, 2003 p 55-61). In spite of their vigorous application of an Islamist trend, Al-Shabaab has proven to be a pragmatic movement, forming broad coalitions with other groups within Somalia when such alliances serves its interests and ever adapting a softer stance towards various social phenomena that it once considered

unacceptable. Through dialogue and resolutions, Al-Shabaab should be brought on board the peace process including them as a political party in government.

The youth are the bulk of the Al-Shabaab organization and most of its members have spent their childhood in a stateless society in the context of a conflict environment. The consequences of this desperate life story for the younger generation in Somalia are a correspondingly desperate voice from the traditional elites. The US added the Al-Shabaab to the global terrorism list in March 2008 (Elmi, 2003 p 75). After this most NGO's who were working towards peace-building in areas controlled by Al-Shabaab left so as not to be associated with terrorists. This left the population in these areas at the mercy of Al-Shabaab. For the Al-Shabaab rather than allowing this act to be a hindrance, they took the terrorist designation and its subsequent international notoriety and literally converted it into capital. Other Islamists group considered to be terrorists began to financially support the Al-Shabaab with more intensity. The terrorists' designation has allowed Al-Shabaab some impunity within Somalia. It has given it greater freedom in framing the conflict as one of Somalia, versus the international interventionists trying to impose a foreign order. This has become a dichotomous framing of "us versus them". There is need to consider engaging more positively with moderate Al-Shabaab leaders as part of the peace process. The United State must be persuaded to delink Al-Shabaab from international terror groups to engage with them and offer the youth opportunities for education and other support while rehabilitating them.

The federal government of Somalia (FGS) is struggling with the help of AMISOM to bring some semblance of security to Somalia. Some areas are relatively peaceful while others are still under siege of armed groups. The FGS must therefore review its approach to security governance particularly in the South and Central regions. A comprehensive security architecture must be developed and supported by the international community a security architecture borne from the lowest local level would be ideal.

Conflicts are never the same. Each context requires a different approach. Establishing security particularly in fragile conflict or post-conflict situations requires a clear focus on security governance. There are three basic components of good security governance that need to be addressed in the Somali case. First is building a set of capable and responsive security institutions that are subject to effective oversight. Second, establishing legitimate security governing principles and norms and third, building an effective legal framework. The FGS must be assisted in this regard.

The focus in Somalia security sector however has been that of international actors wanting to simply and immediately deliver military and police capacity. Such an approach is unlikely to be legitimate and therefore will not ensure sustainability in the long run. In this regard delivering effective security is also about enabling a dialogue on the causes of insecurity. This is then followed by establishing frameworks for negotiations between factions, on appropriate collaborative mechanisms to restore public safety and order. The Public participation in this venture will be critical.

Among the many local peace processes in Somalia, there are some particular illustrative examples of how Somali-led peace processes have incorporated key elements of good security governance into effective security sector practices. This was to be found in the ceasefire arrangements negotiated by the Bakaaro Market business community leaders and the insurgents in Mogadishu in 2008. Recognizing that the externally funded TFG police lacked legitimacy, stakeholders created a new community-based force, including members of the TFG police, to monitor and implement the ceasefire and carry out local policing. Significantly they placed this new police force under the joint control of the parties. In effect they were creating an integrated and more responsive police force and placing it under a more representative, and therefore legitimate governance mechanism. Such an arrangement could only have emerged through genuine negotiations based on recognition of the mutual needs and actual realities of establishing effective security parties (Bradley, 2008). This approach should be embraced and replicated as best practice across the entire South, Central Somalia.

A preventive strategy is necessary to establish constitutional legislative policy and institutional framework that create conditions necessary to prevent emergence of conflict or violence at the national, regional or grassroots level. The government must fully incorporate the local Somali leaders, religious groups and respected clan elders in a collective security arrangement.

Amidst the conflict in Somalia, the new government with the help of the AU and AMISOM is trying to establish building blocks of the security sector. Security sector development for Somalia is made up of legal, policy and institutional reforms at the top level, combined with parallel policy and institutional transformation at the grassroots level. The main objective should be to build capacity and trust in the security sector, entrenched civil society oversight and enhance justice (FGS *document, 2013, official document of the Government of Somalia, Ministry of Justice, Religious Affairs, Constitutions and Federal Reconciliation, p14*). This policy document should be supported and implemented fully.

The National Security Vision of Somalia aims to achieve a secure and an enabled Somalia which is in lasting peace with itself and with its neighbours; capable of restoring and maintaining internal security, providing access to justice, dignity and rule of law. It aims at upholding the human rights of its citizens and with all its security sector adhering to International Humanitarian Law, and is accountable and able to defend its constitution, territorial unity and Integrity (*National Security Framework, document, 2013, Mogadishu, April 2013 p5*). This plan of action must be supported by all stakeholders in the peace process.

According to its current constitution, Somalia is a federal, democratic sovereign republic founded upon the principles of power sharing in a federal system. Independent of the security sector, the National Security Policy (NSP) will reflect Somalia territory as described in Article 7 of the Provisional Constitution, with an appropriate balance between centralized and decentralized forces. The balance between central control and devolving security to the grassroots is critical and must be addressed by the FGS to ensure local leadership feel in charge of security in their area.

The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) has the National Security Stabilization Plan (NSSP) 2011 - 2014, which spells out the achievements of the security vision. The plan provides organs for ensuring militia integration into the Armed Forces, Democratic Oversight, Human Rights, International Humanitarian Law, Development of Maritime Security Strategy and Civil Control of the Armed Forces. This plan has not been implemented and needs to be addressed to enhance security governance.

The Federal Government anticipates a future military that is small, professional and lightly armed, composed of a regenerated Somali National Army (SNA), complemented by modest maritime and air capabilities. While AMISOM is training and building capacity of SNA, establishment of an all-inclusive Army with fair clan representation is a pre-requisite for peace in the country. Training on Human Rights, Rule of Law and general capacity enhancement is required in the short and long term. The FGS needs also to recognize the critical importance of effective policing in the overall process of re-establishing stability and the need for joint and coordinated action between police and Somali Armed Forces. AMISOM and the international community must support this security contingency plan.

The role of traditional elders is recognized by majority of respondents as having played a vital role in providing security in the region. Formal Justice, Sharia Courts and traditional elders are recognized as the primary justice providers in some regions. Respondents however maintained that Sharia Courts are more suited, followed by traditional elders and lastly formal justice

system. These views must be considered by the Federal government. The lower the issues are dealt with the more effective and legitimate they will be.

The question of transitional justice is necessary for peace in Somalia mainly because the country has not yet transitioned into post conflict status. A decision has to be made whether the warlords of the past will continue to hold public offices, be punished for their past human rights abuses or be granted amnesty (Elmi, and Barise, . 2006, p.18). There are people who are still holding onto other people's properties and many victims of murder, rape and displacement are yet to see justice. This situation does not in itself augur well for a peaceful Somalia. The idea of a truth justice and reconciliation must be discussed and included in the peace process in whatever form the Somalis agree on.

It is imperative that the TFG build confidence, stability and security in newly liberated areas through the rapid establishment and operationalization of restorative justice processes based on traditional Somali practices that will complement the broader judicial reform strategy. The idea of a Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC) or its equivalent in the Somali context is a good starting point and can be advanced further to inspire national healing and sustainable trust and peace.

Peace education using Islam is also appropriate for inter clan reconciliation in Somalia since the majority Somalis are Muslims, the peace teachings of Islam will find receptive ears. According to teachings in Islam, a Muslim consciously submits to the will of God and subsequently gains internal and external harmony. Islam is one of the strongest common bonds that unite Somalis as it promotes brotherly values and behaviours such as mutual love, sympathy, assistance and caring for others (Abdullahi, 2007, p.210). This avenue must be explored and effectively applied in the peace process. Religious leaders across the spectrum of the Somali society must be empowered to take lead on this.

National reconciliation necessitates existence of a grass-roots based reconciliation process among communities and clans. This process should be accompanied by gradual expansion of government authority and services in liberated areas. The ground work needs to be laid for communities to develop their local structures. This will be achieved through community driven activities such as civic education. Inclusive grassroots Somali-led reconciliation and national dialogue, addressing the issues of grabbed assets, strengthening justice deliverers and ensuring equality of the Somali people to ensure cardinal pillars of sustainable peace-building are achieved. Other initiatives include an all-inclusive grassroots reconciliation efforts, national

dialogue, willingness to compromise by all, training and peace awareness programmes and overall building a critical mass for peace building and reconciliation.

Despite the lack of trust by many on the new government some respondents felt that there is some goodwill, both local and foreign, that the FGS can seize to promote peace in the country. Initiatives like District Safety Committees (DSCs) are important structures for improving security through creating youth rehabilitation centers. The DSC's bring together government and community to improve security. This must be encouraged in the overall peace process.

The issue of illegal weapons in Somalia must be addressed. Though disarmament cannot be easily carried out in Somalia, it is possible to establish clan leader's registration and control of arms within their communities. Heavy weapons must be collected through this system.

External actors support is also crucial in disarming the Somali society. Somalia emerged as a militarized society during the Siad Barre regime. Members of the Armed Forces sold their weapons to civilians during the economic hardships in the 1980's and State armouries were looted after the collapse of government in 1991. There are also weapons provided by neighbouring countries in support of particular armed groups. In 1992 the UN Security Council passed Resolution 733 which called for an embargo on weapons and military equipment being sent to Somalia. This embargo has however, been violated many times. The supply of weapons continue mainly from, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Yemen, Djibouti, Egypt, Sudan, and Kenya (Hogendoom et al 2003). The UN and international actors must revisit this issue to ensure control of arms flow to Somalia is legitimate and government driven.

The UNSC lifted the embargo to allow for rebuilding of the security sector after election of the new government. Weapons under the custody of local private security providers and Sharia Courts have not been registered and controlled by government (Elmi et al 2007, p.15). The Al-Shabaab has also continued to receive arms from external actors and all these need to be controlled by stern action from the international community.

4.2.5 Environmental Sector

The civil war and the collapse of the state resulted in a lawless society without a regulating mechanism that checked the extreme exploitation of natural resources. Massive charcoal production for export continues in many parts of Somalia. The pressure on the forest cover largely comes from unscrupulous charcoal dealers. The impact of this is soil erosion and irreparable damage to pasture land, thus depleting further the livelihoods of individuals and increasing the danger of resorting to alternative sources of livelihood. The FGS and

stakeholder must address this problem, through a sustainable programme to restore depleted forest cover. The population must be sensitized and supported to use alternative clean energy like solar.

Environmental conservation in Somalia requires a broad political, social and economic approach that factors in environmental contribution to the reconstruction of Somalia and setting a durable foundation for peace and security. Environmental management can form a critical pillar of national development plans to alleviate poverty, reduce conflicts and increase the rate of economic growth (Mbugua, 2013). The environmental sector must be seized with this and draws elaborate plans. The international community needs to support this venture.

Protection of Somalia's biodiversity ensures conservation of community livelihood activities. Traditional mechanisms of resource control can be harmonized with formal laws to create synergy and a more effective regulatory environment. In this regard a National Environment Strategy Action Plan will enhance national economic development and conservation. Conservation of water catchment areas, including management of river basins, is vital for water-scarce Somalia to improve water retention and vegetation cover. The FGS must midwife the (NESAP) with both political and economic support. Donor partners in the environmental sector must come to the aid of Somalia on this aspect.

Internationally, new regulatory regimes have been put in place to prevent environmental degradation (*American Environmental Peace Institute (AEPI) 2009 p7*). Through the UN Somalia can be assisted and other partners also brought on board to enhance capacity for environmental management.

Devolving land management will empower the traditional system that Somalis are more familiar with to resolve land disputes. It is important to bring on board women in environmental management, given their size in society and their engagement with the environment in the process of meeting family livelihood needs.

4.2.6 Somali conflict resolution plan


The data collected and analyzed indeed indicates that the various elements of governance, security, economics, social factors and the environment are key in addressing the conflict in Somalia. These variables must however be addressed in a synchronized manner to ensure a holistic solution is attained. This research has therefore developed a resolution plan for this purpose. The plan gives a roadmap for each thematic area and attempts to synchronize the lines of activities by sequencing them in phases. The individual activities in each line have

been summed up to finally outline conflict resolution implementation plan detailed in chapter six of this research. The plan is summarized in the form of a matrix.

4.2.6.1 Conflict resolution plan matrix

The conflict resolution plan matrix outlines a road map that addresses the five thematic areas in the conflict resolution. It indicates the various lines of operations to be adopted, with sequenced activities in each thematic area build into each other in phases. The activities to be carried out produce specific desired outcomes which eventually results into the overall desired end state of a peaceful post conflict Somalia.

Figure 6 Conflict Resolution Matrix



ELECTED GOVT

**PEACE
STABILITY
PROSPERITY**

Source: Researcher (2017)

4.2.7 Conclusion

This chapter dealt with the presentation and analysis of the data collected in this research. The findings indicate the nature and complexity of the Somali conflict from a multiple of causes. These causes fall within the realms of politics, economics, security, societal and environmental issues broadly. The study explains the various measures required to address the issues therein and concretizes them into a matrix for the sake of coordination. It is this matrix that finally produces a detailed action plan.

CHAPTER FIVE

FAITH AND CULTURAL REFLECTION IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION

5.0 Introduction

This chapter is a theological reflection. It provides the human phase and lense through which conflict particularly in the Somali context is experienced. It is true that ultimately it is the Somali people who can resolve the conflict with assistance of external actors. Religion is a central pillar in the Somali Social fabric and used well can resolve many issues on the conflict and transform the Somali society.

Faith in a religious context is the belief in the doctrines of a religion, based on spiritual conviction. The interpretation of scriptures and religious messages therefore plays a significant role in the orientation and behavior of the faithful. Faith as it is anchored in the scriptures goes hand in hand with secularity in modern states. At times the two are mutually reinforcing while other times, the secular authority vested in individual leaders is not exercised for the common good, but for selfish individual or group interests.

In his book, *'The clash of civilizations'*, Samuel Huntington (1996), argues that this clash inevitably occurs when civilizations see the world through different lenses. Islam and Christianity are both of the Abrahamic faiths, and both view human dignity as a common denominator. However, religious interpretations have often resulted in disagreements and clashes. One of the key drivers of the conflict in Somalia remains religion and particularly religious extremism. This phenomenon can be traced back to the origin of Islam and its growth within the Somali context. This study has chosen to apply the pastoral circle as a tool to view the role of faith in the Somali conflict and use this faith based approach to contribute to the conflict resolution mechanism recommended by the study.

5.1. Social transformation and the Pastoral Cycle in conflict resolution

The human society has continuously desired to improve its living condition in what is commonly referred to as development. The development models practiced however are more concerned with qualitative terms or growth. Qualitative growth only concerns itself with quality of life but

not its sustainability. The qualitative aspect pays little attention to issues such as ecological integrity, social and economic justice, peace and respect for every form of life and its interdependence. The absence of these later forms in development is often a source of conflict especially in Africa.

5.1.1 Social transformation

Studies by many scholars have therefore attempted to address growth in human society that is wholesome and hence sustainable. One of these studies brings about the concept of social transformation which basically entails the transformation in both social reality and peoples collective consciousness. Social reality is transformed when there is a significant change in social systems, in the structure of relationships among people, institutions and society at large. Social reality is also transformed in relation to significant changes in power relations, economic systems, major ecological and environmental changes and all elements that are in various degrees interconnected. A transformation of consciousness on the other hand, means a deep change in peoples and society's assumptive world including beliefs, attitudes, perceptions and understanding of the reality, values and goals (Parise, A 2009).

5.1.2 The Pastoral Cycle

Against the backdrop of social transformation a framework was developed that aims at influencing social transformation towards a society and a world reconciled in justice and love. The Pastoral circle methodology (PCM) was developed by Rev. Prof. Peter Henriot and Joe Holland in 1980. Their book on Social Analysis attempts to explain how justice for a people can be achieved through faith as a medium (Holland and Henriot, 1983). Their views are highly influenced by thoughts and inspirations of Paul Freire. The term Pastoral Cycle is widely used in social ministry and social teachings of the church (Wijsen.2006, p.7.). It has proved a very effective way of bringing social change among rural communities in Latin America, Asia and Africa.

In order to internalize the Somali problem, it is essential that we allow ourselves to be affected by its reality in order to analyze it properly. The pastoral cycle framework described by Holland (2005), in its traditional method of "See, Judge and Act," becomes useful in this research. As described by Luna (2005), in the first step, (To see), we promote a deeper insertion into the

experiences of participants through dialogue, research and participation in the sense of conscientization. The second step, (To judge), we promote a faith vision of the social problems, using religious literature as the guiding beacon and a kind of evangelical discernment. The third step, (To act), means the decision taken by the collective community guided by respected local leaders, chosen by the people and supported by all concerned members of the community.

The Church's social teaching as advocated by Henriot, and Schutheis (1992), explores the inherent gap between theological reflection and social action. These theological teachings can form a firm basis for conflict resolution in a wider context. It can also be contextualized to suit the Somali situation because faith and to some degree religious beliefs, be they Christian, Muslim, Hindu or any other, have their common denominator in human dignity and equality since the golden rule is universal to almost all faiths.

The social teachings of the church can be applied within the context of civic education. This is the cultivation of knowledge and skills necessary for participation in public life. The citizens are empowered to use their rights and discharge their responsibilities on an informed basis. Civic education further provides a forum for citizens to actively participate and engage in governance and public life in society. The citizens acquire knowledge and understanding of the basic operations of government. It further promotes awareness on major social, economic and political issues that affect their lives and informs them about their responsibilities.

The pastoral circle can be used to demonstrate the relevance and the value- added dimension of the church's social teachings. As a tool it can be used to advance the work of advocates of peace and justice in a community that is being assisted. The four essential tenets of this model are Contact, Analysis, Reflection and Response, while focusing on the problem at hand.

5.1.3 Contact

In the case of the Somalia conflict, narratives about what is happening in the conflict situation are told from a particular value perspective - that of the affected population. The basic principle of the church's social teaching places a premium on the experiences, views, needs, feelings and stance of the Somalis themselves, particularly the poor and vulnerable. When contact is made with this segment of society, the question to be asked is what is happening to the poor in this situation.

5.1.4 Analysis

The question that arises is: “Why do such conditions exist in Somalia?” The answer will be guided by those whose rights are being violated and whose responsibilities are called upon to change the situation. The language of rights and responsibilities, rooted in human dignity of each person in the community, pushes analytical approaches beyond economic, political, social or security concerns. Although these four sectors have been given an in-depth analysis in this research, certain questions put to respondents are outside the scope of the four analytical approaches. This was deemed necessary to deepen and widen the research findings.

5.1.5 Reflection

When we come to ask what it means in our faith to evaluate the situation and what is really at stake, we can be guided by the church’s social teachings about human dignity and solidarity. Every person is made in the image of God. Dignity is not earned, it is a gift. Those who are living in relatively safe places as in Kenya are bound together in a unity that the church’s social teachings refer to as solidarity. Reflection guided by the church’s social teachings prompts a motive to act, something that naturally leads to the fourth tenet of the pastoral cycle.

5.1.6 Response

This research recommends what needs to be done in the prevailing situation in Somalia. Two principles of the Church’s social teaching orientate us to the three-fold response of Planning, Action and of Evaluation. The first, places Action at the lowest level possible, that is, Subsidiarity. The second, is the principle that recognizes the most efficient, equitable and sustainable use of resources. The third, to implement subsidiarity demands that planning begins with involvement of those who are most affected, who are closer to the situation and whose cooperation is most essential. The Somali grassroots population represents this essential segment. To this end, Henriot et al (1992), stress that decisions and implementations of policies to address the problems, should not be made at higher levels unless doing so is absolutely unavoidable. The federal government in Mogadishu, as currently constituted, does not have the reach of the entire country due to insecurity. Therefore, addressing security is crucial in engaging with the grass roots.

5.2 Faith (Islam) in the Somali Conflict

The history of Islam is traced by Ling Trevor, to the Arabian Peninsula in the sixth century (Trevor, 1968). The religion consisted of worshippers of various luminous entities of the earth and sky, together with a strong element of what was called humanism or respect for fellow humans. This was a way of life in which there was a strong sense of brotherhood and a high valuation of such virtues as, courage, manliness and generosity. It was soon taken over by a belief in a powerful deity, Allah who was the creator of all things.

The history of the religion is deeply rooted in the city of Mecca, in the Arabian Peninsula. It was a commercial hub with wealthy inhabitants. Muhammad, a member of the Quragish tribe in Mecca, was born about 570 AD. His parents died when he was only six years old and he generally lived in poverty. At the age of forty he declared a call to prophet hood (Watt, 1961). His prophetic messages were delivered in the form of Arabic verses, which were gathered together to form the Quran (Holy Scripture).

The essential elements of Mohammad's preaching were that: God is the creator of the world and man, and is its active controller. He will also bring the world to an end. All men will be raised to appear before him. They will be judged according to the lives they have lived and on that day wealth and power will count for nothing. All men must therefore live with this end in view. The prophet's teachings did not in any way contradict the already existing Christian and Judaic teachings already present in the Arabian Peninsula. Islam in the prophet's sense was the final message from God (Allah) through his Prophet Mohammed. After Mohammed's death Islam continued to spread and its interpretations varied (Phares, 2005). In his book, *Future Jihad*, contends that, Islamic theology projected itself as heir to Judaism and Christianity. Islam is portrayed here as the last monotheist message from Allah

According to Islam, non-believers are perceived to fall into three categories. There are the faithful of the Abrahamic religions, revealed by Allah's prophets, from Adam to Issa (Jesus). Theologically Jesus and Christians are accepted in the Islamic religion, until conversion occurs. The Second category, encompasses religions that are monotheistic, but not of the Book, (i.e Christians) or polytheistic. These faiths have no place in Islamic religion, but arrangements can be made so that conversion takes place promptly. The third category are those who believe in

other deistic systems of faith. This according to Islam must not be tolerated at all. Believing neither in Allah nor in any other god is completely outside the Islamic space and is the total antithesis of Muhammad's religious teachings (Phares, 2005, p. 83). This position becomes significant when internalizing the stand of Islam in contemporary world politics and the ideology of global Jihad.

5.2.1 Islamic Awakening in Somalia

Islam has a long history in Somalia. It is recorded that some of the companions of the prophet who were fleeing persecution in Mecca, visited Somalia and shared the message of Islam with the people there, (Lewis, 1961). As a result, Somalis are considered to be predominantly Sunni Muslims. They also follow the Shafi School of thought, one of the four jurisprudence schools of thought in Sunni sector of Islam. Islamism or political Islam however, is a new phenomenon in Somalia. It was introduced by scholars who returned from the Arab World in the 1960s. Islamism arose with the modern political consciousness of Somalis' newly independent state (*International Crisis Group, ICG 2005, No 100 p12*). A case in point is the arguments of Sheikh Yusuf Al-Qaradawi who rejects the labels and calls for Muslims to reject them as well. He argues that those who use 'Islamism' or 'Political Islam' labels against Islamic movements do so in order to scare away people from Islam's content. The truly sincere men, he contends, call people to comprehensive Islam, which encompasses Faith, Sharia, Religion and State (Al-Qaradawi, 2004).

Islam as a religion has played a significant role in the lives of Somalis. It has a strong identity that competes and at times seeks to replace clan identity for individual Somalis. Islam as a religion and system of values permeates all aspects of Somali life, such that, it is difficult to conceive of any meaning in the term Somali itself, without at the same time implying Islamic identity (Elmi, 2010).

Somali clans also use Islam when resisting what they consider to be transgressions from other clans. Using Islamic terminology and vocabulary, clans develop a collective feeling of injustice and organize militia groups in order to defend themselves against more dominant clans. During the civil war clans used religious rhetoric in mobilizing people against the Siad Barre Regime (Elmi, 2010).

The phenomenon that combines religion and politics is commonly referred to as political Islam. As Sayid argues, political Islam is not an appropriate term when one wants to make sense of modern Islamic movements in the Muslim world (Sayyid, 1997). Another Islamic related term commonly used is Islamism. (Guilain 2002) defines Islamism as a form of “instrument” used by individuals, groups and organizations who pursue political objectives. Muslim Scholars who are the pioneers of these movements disagree with the labels of Islamism or political Islam. Other scholars, like Graham Fuller, argue that Islamists are those who believe that Islam as a body of faith has something important to say about how politics and how society should be ordered. Fuller and Denoeux (2002), agrees with this position that indeed in the Islamic world, the line between Islam and Politics is thin.

5.2.2 Evolution of Islamic Awakening in Somalia

The two major schools of Islamic teachings to emerge in Somalia were the (Ikwani) and (Salafi) schools, which are also found within Islamic groups all over the world, are also present in Somalia. The first school established in 1928 in Egypt, has several Somali Islamic movements identifying with it (Elmi, 2010), The second school, Salafi was represented in Somalia by Al-Itihad Al-Islam in 1980s and was disbanded in 1997. Currently, the Salafi orientation in Somalia is represented by the Al-Shaab, Hizbul-Islam and Salafiya Dida organizations.

These Islamic groups in Somalia all clearly want to transform Somalia society and its institutions. According to their proclamations their goal is also the establishment of an Islamic state in the country. They prefer Sharia to become the basis of all legislation and all aim to make Somalia a society that observes Islamic requirements. However, although these groups have similar objectives, they differ in their approaches and in their methods of social change. During the Siad Barre regimes, such movements were considered illegal. As a result, members of these movements conducted their work discreetly and recruited new members secretly, (Elmi, 2010).

5.2.3 The Role of Religion in the Somali Conflict

The period from January 1991 until December 1992 was characterized by a civil war in Somalia. This entailed very high levels of human insecurity, which was a new social reality. This fact influenced the significance and form of religious practice. People for instance, read the Quran more often in the quest for spiritual support, (Marchal, 2007). Identification with Islam also

became a means to achieve security. The youth militia avoided attacking religious people for the fear of God's punishment.

In Somalia today and the world in general, Islam is a very powerful force and more so its interpretation. The narrative of Jihad as a war to create an Islamic caliphate has been used in some instances to justify violence. The term *Jihad* means using one's all strength and resisting every difficulty to achieve a goal. In Islam it suggests a special characteristic; struggling in the path of God. It occurs in two fronts, internal and external. The internal struggle (greater Jihad) is the effort to attain one's essence. The external Jihad (loner Jihad) is the process of enabling someone else to attain his or her essence so that people can choose freely between belief and unbelief (Fethullah, 2004).

This narrative ought to be countered by the positive ideology of jihad as it is in the holy Quran (Verse 25:52). In this particular verse and teaching in the Quran, the concept of jihad is expressed as seeking believers to strive more strenuously. It advocates the divine ideology of peaceful struggle. It implies to speak to non-Muslims so that the words reach their very soul (Verse 4:63).

The desired approach, according to the Quran therefore, is one which moves men's heart and mind. That is, in addressing peoples' minds, it satisfies them, convinces them of the veracity of the Quran and, in short, brings about social transformation within them. This is the mission of the Quran and this mission can be performed only by means of rational arguments and can never be achieved by means of violence or armed action.

5.2.4 Conclusion

The use of the pastoral circle is not an attempt to endorse a particular culture or values of religious orientation, but it should help theology to be in permanent dialogue with cultures. The understanding and application of different stages of the pastoral circle, particularly between social analysis and theological reflection can be applied under any religious or spiritual values, whether Christian or Muslim. At the most basic level of either social action or theological reflection, what is essential is the welfare and the interests of the people. Going through the pastoral circle in the context of the Somali situation will transform both the social situation and theologies of individuals therein. The resolution of conflict in general and in Somalia in

particular can- not be achieved without going back to faith and social teachings of religion. The Somali people hold religion highly and religious inclusion in resolution is critical.

CHAPTER SIX

GENERAL SUMMARY, RECOMMENDATIONS AND RESOLUTION IMPLEMENTATION PLAN

6.0 General Summary

Resolving a Protracted Social Conflict (PSC) such as in Somalia requires the knowledge on macro- and micro contexts of unpeaceful relations. An in-depth analysis of the current conflict was significant in this thesis in order to provide a context based study, with the objectives of providing a wholesome practical resolution implementation matrix that can be applied by the mediators. Arising from the research, a number of lessons have been learnt that may be factored into the resolution implementation framework as outlined below:

The Somalis' deep involvement in the peace process is critical. Negotiations cannot be driven by external actors or they quickly lose legitimacy. Ownership by Somalis themselves means that they must determine the agendas, timetables and procedures. External actors must help them and facilitate this process. There ought to be a combination of the most effective traditional and contemporary peace initiatives. Such innovations were witnessed at the *Arta* Peace talks, discussed earlier, which had very positive results.

Representation in political negotiations in a society with deep clan identities such as Somalia is deeply contested no matter how it is determined. Some systems of representation must be designed to accommodate the clan interests. The 4.5 clan formula that has been relied upon to determine clan representation in talks and in transitional governments is a good starting point. It is worth noting that a formula on the systems of representation has been devised at sub-national peace talks and have been fairly successful.

This, research has clearly brought out the fact that reconciliation processes cannot and must not be reduced to power sharing deals by political elites and warlords. The cake-cutting approach has repeatedly failed and is contributing to growing cynism among Somalis about peace processes. The Mbagathi peace process was the first attempt to tackle this problem with some level of success.

Although the establishment of transitional governments is an unavoidable component of the peace accords, their endorsement to continue governing beyond the agreed timelines does not augur well for peace. External Actors must therefore press Somali leaders to focus on executing key transitional tasks rather than building maximalist security states.

All external actors to the mediation process must have a clear strategy to understand and manage spoilers to peace processes. This includes differentiations between ‘intrinsic’ spoilers-warlords and others who have no interest in allowing a revived central government and situational-spoilers with specific issues on aspects of the accord or power sharing arrangement.

It is also important to note that, due to the various competing interests of groups, there is need to create political space for a ‘loyal opposition’ to allow groups unhappy with aspects of an accord or transitional government to voice their objectives without becoming rejectionists opposing the entire process. The Al-Shabaab and other such groups in this regard can be accommodated in the peace process.

Finally, it is essential to develop more creative transitional security and stabilization mechanisms. These should be designed to alleviate the lack of security for anxious communities during early phases of implementing peace accords. Creating a single security sector government has the prospect of a monopoly on the use of violence and virtually guarantees the rise of rejectionist spoilers.

6.1 Recommendations

The holistic conflict resolution plan recommended in this research is based on a conceptual framework that will ensure human security. It borrows from Barry Buzzan’s Sectoral Approach to human security. It is anchored on Political, Security, Economic, Societal and Environmental Sectors respectively:

6.1.1 Political Sector

The Political Sector is broad and cross-cutting. Although politics is deeply embedded in the Somali conflict, it is not the ultimate solution in the peace process. The key ingredients that the research has isolated are governance, power and actors:

6.1.2 Governance

Lessons learnt from the numerous past peace conferences and mediation efforts give credence to the type of governance that benefits Somalia. The daunting task of State revival to the challenges of reconciliation and power sharing must be addressed. Disputes over representation legitimacy and authority which are all susceptible to Somalia's centrifugal political dynamics, exacerbated by the fissionable nature of clanism can be addressed from the 4.5 clan representation formula.

6.1.3 Power Relations and Political Roadmap

While peace itself is viewed by most Somalis as a positive-sum game, revival of a Central Government is viewed by many as Zero-sum contest and hence a risky enterprise. Somalis evidently prefer a revived State but they fear the consequences of losing control of the process to rivals. A loose central government with strong federal states would overcome these fears.

6.1.4 External Actors

Several Somali reconciliation efforts have been clearly mediated with the intent of providing a political outcome in favor of local allies. Others started relatively neutral, but once the process was underway – mediators made decisions which tilted the playing field in favor of one or another political group. Such external attempts to broker expedient deals are usually based on a crude and ill-informed understanding of the nature of power in Somalia. Regional and International bodies like the AU and UN must therefore identify any neutral external mediators of the peace process. Those with direct interest such as neighbours of Somalia must not play a very active role.

6.2 Security Sector

The focus in the Security Sector in Somalia has placed emphasis on the apparent need to simply and immediately deliver military and law enforcement capacity. This has started with the efforts to neutralize armed groups involved in the conflict and pacifying the areas under their control. Such an approach is unlikely to be viewed legitimate by Somalis and therefore will not ensure sustainability in the long run. In this regard, delivering effective security is also about enabling a

dialogue on the causes of insecurity and on appropriate and collaborative mechanisms to restore public safety and order.

6.2.1 Security Governance

Instituting a functional security regime requires the art of security governance. This has three basic components that need to be addressed: Building a set of capable and responsive security institutions that are subject to effective oversight; establishing legitimate security governing principles and norms and building an effective legal framework. These three thematic areas have to be coordinated at the highest governance level.

6.2.2 Local Security Strategies

The missing element from a successful security strategy in the Somalia conflict has been the lack of serious attention to negotiated security arrangements. In the case of the externally fueled TFG, the Police Commander in the case of Bakaaro area in Mogadishu was appointed by the TFG and therefore lacked legitimacy. Stakeholders in Bakaaro created a new Community-based force, including members of the TFG Police, to monitor and implement the ceasefire and carryout local policing. Significantly, they placed this new police force under the joint control of the parties. In effect they were creating an integrated and more responsive police force placing it under a more representative, and therefore legitimate governance mechanism. Such an arrangement could only have emerged through genuine negotiations based on recognition of the mutual needs and actual realities of establishing effective security parties.

6.3 Economic Sector

In all conflict areas, the Somali economy has largely depended on the resilience of Somalis entrepreneurship and economic solidarity of the people particularly in the diaspora.

6.3.1 Resource mobilization and distribution

Economic factors underline much of the conflict in Somalia. Resource mobilization and distribution is at the centre of this conflict. The Siad Barre Regime used a combination of Socialist-Style legislation, International military relief assistance and Political nepotism in an effort to capture the country's major economic assets and concentrate economic power at the

centre. This economic power was then distributed largely to the Siad Barre regime affiliates at the expense of the larger Somali community. The Somali community must see this trend reversed and efforts to liberalize the economy to benefit all must be demonstrated by the governing elite.

6.3.2 Economic Security and Power

Since the collapse of the State, the quest for economic security and power has taken place at local and regional levels. Throughout Somalia, countless actors seek access to whatever sources of local revenue available. Everything has a strong economic component from the imposition of roadblocks by militia along strategic transport routes, to private operations off the North Coast and efforts by competing religious movements including Al-Shabaab to seize control of villages and economic assets. The government and the international community must support Somali to develop the economy from the grassroots upwards and not vice versa without sound economic structures on the ground, powerful warlords and militia will continue to dominate.

6.3.3 Political Institutions

Despite what is clearly a locally oriented, economically driven quest for security by Somali's citizens, International efforts to bring stability to the country have focused on Political Institutions. National peace conferences have had their goal as the restoration of a functioning Central Government on the assumption that effective National Government is a prerequisite for economic recovery. The vibrant commerce across Somalia's border with Kenya has also brought modest prosperity to the communities living across the border and beyond. It appears strangely that in Somalia economic recovery is leading political recovery, despite the conventional notion that political reconstruction ought to come first. This must be supported and the locals empowered to this end.

6.3.4 Somalia Business Community

The Somali business community has also played an important role in reconciliation efforts working with local activists and NGO's seeking to establish peace. The wealthy and well-connected members of the business community have the most influence on policy. These Somali entrepreneurs often with bases outside Somalia have moved away from profiteering in the 'War

Economy' and begun to diversify into the service sector (Finance, Transport, Information Technology and the Construction industries) with the import-export trades to include Somalia's neighbours. The government must ensure it makes it easy for the entrepreneurs to start, and diversify business enterprises.

6.3.5 New Generation Entrepreneurs

The new generation of businessmen and women may possess the potential to bring a new dynamic to the Somali situation from the younger generation. They have often complained that most of the players at national peace conferences are products of or have ties with the older generation of politicians, and that when this older generation is replaced; there is likelihood of substantive progress in peace talks. The younger generation may become catalysts for the development of formal and informal business 'schools' with Somalia and its neighbours.

Many of this younger generation of Somalis have studied or trained abroad. They possess language and technical skills which the older generation lacks and have connections with business partners and firms outside Somalia. If engaged they are better positioned to participate proactively in the wider regional economy rather than simply relying on clan nepotism or looking for handouts from international donors. These new business actors have access to and respect for professionals in the Somali diaspora. Their contacts and skills might be put to more effective use if they partner with diaspora private firms.

6.3.6 Peace Entrepreneurs

Given the many challenges, it may well appear that Somalia's economic entrepreneurs have little chance of altering the current political trajectory in Somalia. However, if the limited economic recovery led by the private sector is enhanced, more people will find an alternative to the economy of predation, get a stake in an alternative economy and take part in the predictable peaceful flow of goods and services. The more attractive alternative would also be to encourage the Somalis to see better economic security in their markets than in their clan militia. In this way they are more likely to bring pressure on their leaders to support a regime of law and order. The international donors and policymakers may also consider prioritizing projects that promote business training, cooperating with successful entrepreneurs in improving infrastructure in

regions where peaceful commerce has emerged and looking for more effective ways to use the economic expertise of Somalis in the diaspora.

6.4 Societal Sector

Five segments of Somali society play an important role in conflict and conflict resolution. If handled prudently these sectors can be critical to the conflict resolution. These are the Elders, Youth, Women, the Clan and Islam as their sole religion.

6.4.1 Clan Elders

The three ways a person can become an elder in the Somali society is, through an election process whereby clan and Sub-clan members choose their elder. This is the most legitimate and preferred method. The second is through inheritance, when a prominent and well-respected elder dies and clan members crown the son of the elder and ask him to assume the responsibilities of his father. The third way is through appointment by the authorities. This is the least effective method as Somalis abhor central authority.

The roles of the elders among others, particularly in the peace process, are to prevent and resolve conflicts within the Sub-clan with the help of the other elders using the (Xeer) Customary Law and Sharia. The clan elders are therefore a vital part of the resolution process particularly when they are legitimate. With political and financial support from the international community, their role can be very useful in the resolution of the Somali conflict.

6.4.2 The Youth

The youth have continued to play a vital role in the Somali Conflict. They have always been the pool for militia groups fighting in Somalia. The 'Al-Shabaab' group means the youth, and is an off-shoot of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) which was made up of mainly the youth from Mogadishu. The issues that propelled the youth to join these militia groups are complex, relating to identity formation, diverse generational views and how different generations in the diaspora engage with the homeland.

Attitudes of the Somali youth particularly those in the diaspora need to be contextualized in Somalia's political landscape. Somalia has a large diaspora created by transnational migration

and mainly due to the conflict. Among these many are young people born outside Somalia. This young Somali diaspora is different from older Somali migrants who have generally formed along clan identities. The older generation have often reasserted their Islamic values and embraced their Islamic identity. They also find it hard to integrate and constantly look to Somalia while they are engrossed in the political dynamics of the homeland, waiting for the possibility to return.

For the young generation, identification with their culture can become more entrenched when central elements of it come under pressure or threat and they can embrace the more controversial aspects of it. In this sense for young Somalis, Muslim identity can take precedence over clan and national identity.

The adoption of the young can also be seen through the lens of hybrid identity. Through multiculturalism youngsters often create hybrid diaspora identities. This allows them to identify with many different sub-identities. These youngsters see themselves as having a fluid nomadic conscience that enables them to embrace different identities opposed to first Muslim and the clan they belonged to. The government needs to engage and encourage this group to take part in peace activities and move away from being used as militia. Education opportunities for the youth must be strengthened.

6.4.3 Somali Women in Conflict Resolution

A number of factors prevent women from playing a full part in conflict resolution: gender bias, domestic chore duties, large families among others. Nevertheless, women who have had the opportunity to participate in conflict resolution have exerted a real ability and have been influential in ensuring the prioritization of gender concerns.

It is also important to observe that there is no armed conflict in Africa that is fundamentally about gender issues. However, every issue that armed conflict is about has gender implications, whether the issue be ethnic identity, reparations or ownership and access to resources like water, land, minerals or even political office (Ryan, 2014)

Despite historical indications that women have been the backbone of Somali society, their political, cultural and economic contributions have rarely been acknowledged and therefore

remain marginalized. They remain absent from main discourses on Somalia. This is due to the fact that it is primarily men who write about the situation in Somalia, viewing male realities as that of the whole society. The women must be engaged and encouraged to participate in peace initiatives and activities both in the formal and informal sector.

Conflict, war and violence, reinforces and exacerbates divisions within communities such as in Somalia. Once such divisions are created, they cannot be easily undone without the active participation of women. In a strong clan-centric system such as in Somalia women can play an important unifying role. Since women are born into one clan and often marry into another, they are in an ideal position to bridge the gaps that exist between these two clans. Most women are aware of the importance of the multiplicity of connections the warring communities have. They see themselves as mothers to children of one family, as daughters and on remarriage, as mothers to offspring from yet another lineage. While the men remain true to their fathers' ancestral identity, the women do not. Thus women should be an essential part of any lasting conflict resolution in Somalia.

6.4.4 The Clan

The clans also have customary laws used to resolve disputes such as the payment of a limited amount of money as compensation for homicide. Muslim scholars however have advocated the application of a combination of both Islamic and customary law. Somali customary law also states that the concept of punishment for a crime is largely absent as a basis for resolving disputes. Instead, the practice is one of restitution with the level of compensation negotiated by elders. The clan factor cannot be ignored in conflict resolution and can be accommodated positively, by engaging respected clan elders.

6.4.5 The Islamic Factor and Social Order

Peace and reconciliation are among the fundamental tenets of Islam, which preaches the virtue of the conflict resolution method known as 'SULU' – or pacification. This is mentioned in several verses of the Quran along with the importance of promoting reconciliation. According to Islam promoting reconciliation is an act of goodness and people are encouraged to resolve their differences this way.

Islam has always played a tangible role in peacemaking and peace-building. Muslim Scholars-“*The Ulema*”, command automatic respect and people have always turned to them to help with unresolved disputes. During Somalia reconciliation meetings the *Ulema* have played important roles by counseling negotiators and urging them to show flexibility and compromise. They would urge leaders to refer to Islam in resolving their differences.

Since Islam is both an identity and faith in Somalia, its influence in the Somali conflict is seen in the evolution of Islamist movements over the last fifty years. The Islamist movements are present realities who have both limitations and opportunities. Strategies used to contain these Islamic movements have not often succeeded as the Islamist movements always either metamorphose or spring up afresh. As long as Islamists are not challenged by external actors they will enjoy the support of the Somali people. This makes Islamist role basically inevitable in Somalia and should be factored in any resolution framework.

6.5 The Environmental Sector

The past attempts to resolve the Somali conflict have laid emphasis on political and military settlement, while ignoring the impact of the conflict on the natural environment. Subsumed as it is, this study has shown that there is a linkage between the environment and conflict. Furthermore, the fragmentation and loss of statehood has provided fertile grounds for illegal dumping of waste and unregulated and unsustainable use of natural resources. The conditions and the widespread violence that affected agricultural production as well as the hostile and harsh environment, brings to the fore environmental concerns that must now be addressed or sustainable peace may be elusive.

To include the environmental aspect in the resolution of conflict, there is therefore need to ensure that any development projects initiated must have an environmental dimension to accommodate the destruction already realized. There is need for the government to include a reforestation component to alleviate soil erosion and rebuild forest cover; this would help also to check drastic climate change. There is also need for reopening of other avenues of livelihoods to accommodate those populations whose livelihoods sources have been undermined by the environmental factor

6.6 Conclusion

This chapter has summarized broadly what was discussed as causing the conflict and from the measures deemed necessary to address the conflict specific recommendation have been made. To ensure these recommendations are made practical, a resolution implementation plan has been developed that outlines specific activities to be carried out by peace practitioners. The activities are grouped within the five thematic areas and approximate timelines given for better synchronization.

Table 3: Somali Conflict Resolution Implementation Plan

THEMATIC AREA	ACTIVITY	ACTOR	TOOLS	TIMEFRAME
POLITICAL	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Formation of Interim Administration. - National dialogue and reconciliation. - Strengthening Governance. - Civic Education. - Formation of Political Parties. - Elections. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - AU, International Community. - Interim administration, Clan leaders & Religious leaders. - Civil Society, Interim Admin. - Civic leaders, Community leaders. - AU, UN, Interim Admin. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Dialogue, Community leaders. - Peace Campaigns, Traditional Structures. - Education, Advocacy. - Dialogue, Negotiations - Mediation, Organizations 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 1-3 yrs - 1-5 yrs - 1-5 yrs - 1-10 yrs - 1-10 yrs
ECONOMIC	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - UN Resolution for International Support. - Resource mobilization. - Diaspora Investment mobilization. - Development Projects. - Investors 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - AU & UN - International Community, Interim Administration. - Interim Administration. - International Community, Interim Admin, Somalia investors and Diaspora. - Foreign direct investors 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Political lobbying. - Engagement. - Engagement. - Strategic Plans 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 1-10 yrs

SOCIETAL	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Organize clan members. - Organize Religious Leaders - Organize Youth and Women. - Traditional peace building structures. - Grassroots sensitization on value of peace. - Engage armed groups to lay down arms. - Repatriate refugees. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Interim Admin, Civil society. - Interim Admin, Civil society. - Interim Admin, Civil society. - Clan leaders, religious leaders. - Civil society. - Clan leaders. - UNHCR. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Dialogue. - Dialogue. - Dialogue. - Dialogue. - Engagement. - Dialogue, mediation - Financial support. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 1-3 yrs - 1-10 yrs. - 1-5 yrs. - 1-10 yrs.
SECURITY	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Degrade Armed groups. - Disarm, Demobilize and integrate former fighters. - Establish local security structures. - Train local security agencies. - Establish rule of law. - Support peace forces.& help reform security sector. - Address environmental concerns. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Military and Police forces under AMISOM. - Military AU, UN.& Interim Administration - Military and Police. - Military, Police & Interim Admin. - Military, Civil Society. - Military, Police, Interim Admin. - Community leaders, Civil society & International community. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Force of Arms. - Force and dialogue - Military & Interim Admin. - Military and Police from AMISOM. - Awareness Campaign 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 1-10 yrs - 1-10 yrs

ENVIRONMENT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - NESAP - Conservation Projects. - Post Conflict Environmental Impact Assessment - Environmental Community Programme. - Environmental Rehabilitation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Interim Govt, NGOs & Civil society. - Interim Govt, NGOs & Civil Society. - Interim Govt, NGOs & Civil Society. - Interim Govt - Interim Govt, NGOs & Civil Society. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Research - Strategic Plan - Strategic Plan - Strategic Plan - Strategic Plan 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 1-10 yrs - 1-10 yrs. -1-2 yrs - 1-10 yrs - 1-15 yrs
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Source: Researcher (2017)

6.7 General Conclusion

The Somali problem has been primarily viewed by many stakeholders as a political problem and that political actors need to be reconciled around the governmental table. Indeed most Somalis love politics and the country's powerbrokers including business people have benefited considerably from the infusion of international aid in support of peace conferences and interim government budgets. Such initiatives have clearly not brought economic security to the majority of citizens and the absence of which cannot guarantee overall security. In effect they perpetuate certain patterns of political behavior that hinder the search for peace. It is time economic initiatives were given prominence to allow Somalis do what they know best to guarantee peace.

The five securitized sectors that this research has recommended will ensure that the conflict in Somalia is not resolved piecemeal. The sectors overlap and must be dealt with concurrently. The challenge though lies in the coordination mechanism at the Amisom level. The head of the mission must ensure close coordination by connecting the various sectoral heads and ensuring they continuously engage and coordinate their activities. An effective coordination mechanism for such a complex resolution framework is key and is hereby recommended for future research.

6.8 Dissemination of the thesis

This study is deemed useful to the actors in the Somalia peace process from the United Nation, African Union and other stake holders particularly within AMISOM. The AMISOM leadership should use the implantation framework to orchestrate activities within the thematic areas recommended. Through the Ministry of Defence Kenya, it is hoped that this will be facilitated. For Academic purpose, the research will be availed to other academic institution and in future will hopefully be published.

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APPENDIX 1: RESEARCH QUESTIONNAIRE TO BE COMPLETED BY RESPONDENT

My name is George Owinow, a post graduate student from the institute of Social Ministry, Tangaza University College of Catholic University of Eastern Africa, Nairobi Kenya.

I am conducting a research on resolving the conflict in South, Central Somalia. Kindly assist by completing this questionnaire. The research is part of the fulfillment of the course requirements. I request you to answer the questions by ticking either a 'YES' or 'NO' and may expound on your answer if you so wish by writing your appropriate response. All the information collected will be used solely for Academic and research purpose. Strict confidentiality of the information you provide is guaranteed.

SECTION A: - Somali Village Elders (Social factors)

SECTION B: - Somali Grass Root Village Leaders (Governance at grassroots)

SECTION C: - Somali Security Agents and AMISOM Staff (Security)

SECTION D: - Somali Government Officials (Economics)

SECTION E: - Somali Women Leaders (Gender)

SECTION F: - Somali Religious Leaders (Religion)

SECTION G: - Environment

SECTION A: SOCIAL FACTORS

Q 1. Nearly all conflicts in Somalia today break out along clan lines.

- a. YES
- b. NO

Q 2. Clan identities are not the basis for conflicts in Somalia: rather their deliberate manipulation creates and drives conflict.

- a. YES
- b. NO

Q 3. Clan identities are flexible and can be shaped by leaders to pursue control of power and resources.

- a. YES
- b. NO

Q 4. Clan groups can serve as destructive or constructive forces as well as traditional conflict moderators.

- a. YES
- b. NO

Q 5. Cross – Clan partnerships through Civil society organizations (CSO's), businesses and local initiatives can work towards development and peace by building trust among clans.

- a. YES
- b. NO

SECTION B: GOVERNANCE

Q 1. Struggle for control of the state, which brings political and economic power, has been a continuing source of conflict.

- a. YES
- b. NO

Q 2. Absence of good governance and experience with a repressive State, have made Somalis suspicious of government.

- a. YES
- b. NO

Q 3. What structure of government arising from the peace processes do think is best suitable to solve the Somali Conflict?

- a. A federal State with a minimum central government.
- b. A strong Central State
- c. A confederate State composed of entities e.g. Somaliland and Puntland, loosely tied together in the confederation of the Republic of Somalia.

Q 4. The interests of external actors particularly, Kenya and Ethiopia in the context of a greater Somalia are derailing the Somali peace process.

- a. YES
- b. NO

Q 5. The Western Powers and economic support for the Somali peace is critical for the conflict resolution.

- a. YES
- b. NO

SECTION C: SECURITY

Q 1. The culture of militarization of State organs under Barre to enforce Law and Order was the source of militia culture in Somalia.

- a. YES
- b. NO

Q 2. The continued proliferation of small arms makes minor conflicts in Somalia more lethal.

- a. YES
- b. NO

Q 3. With increased violence, clan elders lost influence over their members, while militia leaders lost control over their followers.

- a. YES
- b. NO

Q 4. An organized and effective disarmament, demobilization and reintegration into productive life of combatants and militiamen can transform the conflict.

- a. YES
- b. NO

Q 5. Do you think that the Al-shabaab group and other armed militia groups should be allowed to participate in the peace process as stake holders?

- a. YES
- b. NO

SECTION D: ECONOMICS

Q 1. The control of commercial arteries like Seaports, Airstrips and Key roads by Warlords supported by business groups and clans is a source of conflict in Somalia.

- a. YES
- b. NO

Q 2. Diasporal remittances through the Hawala money transfer system is funding some of the Warlords and fueling the conflict.

- a. YES
- b. NO

Q 3. Private sector activity such as joint business ventures protected by armed groups is across – clans and so may be a factor of conflict reduction.

- a. YES
- b. NO

SECTION E: GENDER

Q1. War affects both combatants and those not directly involved in the combat. Would you say the Somali women have suffered more in the war than the men?

- a. YES
- b. NO

Q2. Have the Somali women been able to play an active role in promoting peace and reconciliation in the conflict?

- a. YES
- b. NO

Q3. Can the women in Somalia unite beyond clan boundary?

- a. YES
- b. NO

Q4. Do you think education for women in Somalia would empower them play a leadership role in peacemaking?

- a. YES
- b. NO

Q5. There are a number of cross-clan marriages, does this increase or reduce conflict in the society?

- a. Increase
- b. Reduce

SECTION F: RELIGION

Q1. Is there a fundamental difference between Islam and Political Islam?

- a. YES
- b. NO

Q2. When Somalia was isolated in the region it joined the Arab league in 1974 and many students went to receive training in foreign religious institutions. In your view could this have resulted in the social transformation regarding Islam and Political Islam.

- a. YES
- b. NO

Q3. Do you think the Union of the Islamic Courts (UIC) were useful in bringing some peace and order in Somalia during their time?

- a. YES
- b. NO

Q4. Do you think the categorization of political Islamic as extremism is unnecessarily distorting the true nature of Islam?

- a. YES
- b. NO

Q5. Do you think various armed groups in Somalia have turned religion into a tool for propagating power by urging Jihad?

- a. YES
- b. NO

SECTION G: ENVIRONMENT

Q1. Do you think there is a linkage between the environment and conflict in Somali?

YES

NO

Q2. Do you think the control of access to pasture land by some clans is a source of conflict in Somalia?

YES

NO

Q3. Massive Charcoal production for export continues in Somalia, do you think this is fuelling the conflict.

YES

NO

Q4. There has been widespread dumping of waste in the Somalia Coastal areas; do you think this is affection the livelihood of the people living there?

YES

NO

Q5. Do you think the ever diminishing water resources are causing conflict between the clans?

YES

NO

APPENDIX 2: DISCUSSION GUIDE FOR FOCUS GROUP (ELDERS AND RELIGIOUS LEADERS)

The researcher and team of assistants will discuss openly with the focus group made up of mainly elders and religious leaders. They are considered to be at the apex of opinion leaders within the Somali society at the grassroots level. They are not only respected but are expected to give direction on all clan matters.

The focus group will be guided to discuss issues concerning governance and their structures, security matters, how they view the conflict and suggested resolution methods. Other social issues will also be discussed. These opinions will add weight to the responses from questionnaires.

- 1.What are their views on the structure of governance where the central government is in control of all matters security related.
- 2.What are their views on grassroots governance.
- 3.What are some of the things contributing to insecurity.
- 4.How can religious be effectively used to resolve the conflict.
- 5.How can the warring groups particularly the Al-Shabaab be intergrated back into society.
- 6.Share anything else concerning the Somali conflict and how it can be resolved holistically.

Appendix 3: Research Budget

S/No.	Item	Description	Estimated Amount (Kshs)
1.	Stationary and Bureau Services	Typing, printing and binding for several defense sessions and up to the final copy	70,000.00
2	Data Collection	2 Research Assistant pay for 15 days (Cumulatively)	160,000.00
3	Kodak pocket tape recorders	Qty (4) @ 10,000.00	40,000.00
Total amount (Approx)			270,000.00

Note: Most of logistics expenses by the researcher and assistants were borne by the employer since the study was conducted while performing normal professional duties.

Appendix 4: Map of Somalia



Map adopted From Somalia to Move Beyond the Failed State by International Crisis Group
Africa Report No 147, 23 December 2008, Page 32

Appendix 5: Field trip to Doblely-Somalia



The researcher briefing some of the research assistants at Doblely in Somalia

Appendix 6: Meeting with focus group – Kismayo



The researcher meeting with Somali clan elders and religious leaders

Appendix 7: Research Assistant at village – Dobley



Research assistant with a Somali child in the village (Dobley)